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Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law
LYNNE HENDERSON*
INTRODUCTION
Erwin Chemerinsky began his foreword to the 1989 Harvard Law Review's
Supreme Court issue with the statement "[b]y any standard, the 1988-1989
Supreme Court Term was momentous."' And it is not difficult to justify
his characterization or an accompanying concern about a dramatic shift in
constitutional adjudication in the United States when viewing the Court's
term, which "narrowed abortion rights, limited government affirmative
action programs, restricted the scope of civil rights laws, permitted capital
pumshment of juveniles and the mentally retarded, approved drug testing
and constricted the availability of habeas corpus."
'2
While many liberal-progressive constitutional scholars have noted the
"conservative" shift in the Court's decisions and are voicing concern and
proposing alternative strategies, 3 it is the thesis of this Article that the
problem is authoritariamsm, not conservativism per se.4 While conservatism
may mean a sense of caution or a respect for tradition that is not absolute
or inflexible, 5 authoritarianism represents inflexibility and oppression.
* Professor of Law, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloomington. I thank Paul
Brest, Donald Ehrman and Robin West for their help and encouragement, as well as their
patience with my kvetching, throughout the writing of flus article. I also want to express my
gratitude to Jost Delbrtick, Don Gjerdingen, Marjorie Kornhauser, Robert Weisberg and Frank
Michelman for their interest, time and help with various drafts, and to Lauren Robel for
giving me a central, clarifying insight. The article benefitted enormously in its early stages
from comments made by the participants in the Umversity of Texas Faculty Workshop and
an Indiana University colloquium. Finally, I am grateful to the Cleveland-Marshall fund for
supporting the initial research for the article.
1. Chemernsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution,
103 HAnv. L. Rnv 43, 44 (1989).
2. Id. Although tlus Article does not seek to defend the proposition, it may be that we
are at the juncture of another of Professor Ackerman's "transformative" constitutional
moments, a kind of critical realignment in the Court's constitutional decisionmaking as a result
of changes in the federal judiciary. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99
YALE L.J. 453, 545 (1989).
3. See Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REv 189
(1988); West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MicH. L. REv 641 (1990)
[hereinafter West, Constitutionalism].
4. See West, Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 655-57 & n.26; Bnsbin, Conservative
Jurisprudence in the Reagan Era, 19 CumB. L. Rnv 497, 526-28 (1989) (authoritarianism is
major element of conservatism).
5. See Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); Wilson, Justice
Diffused: A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism with the Views of Five Conservative
Academic Judges, 40 U. MwAM L. Ray 913 (1986).
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Consistent with authoritarianism, much of the Court's jurisprudence in the
last few years appears to manifest inflexibility, lack of compassion, and
approval of oppression. Indeed, during the past decade, there has been an
increasing concern about the growth of right-wing authoritarianism in the
United States: The American political turn to the right in the 1980s, together
with the resurgence of active manifestations of racism,6 anti-semitism and
nativism,7 provide reason to consider authoritarianism and its relation to
law This Article argues that there has been a parallel increase in authori-
tarianism in legal thought and judicial practice in the United States during
this same period that should be of great concern to those who view law as
an institution for human progress.
Recently, the words "authoritarian" and "authoritarianism" have fre-
quently appeared in legal scholarship.8 After the Supreme Court's decision
in Bowers v Hardwick,9 several scholars expressed open concern about the
Court's decision, noting that it was authoritarian both in its reasoning and
its result.'0 But thus far, it does not appear that scholars have examined
6. Lee & Fernandez, Legislative Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: The Massachusetts
Experience and Beyond, 25 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REv 287, 287, 319, 325 (1990).
7 Nativist sentiment has sometimes taken the form of the enactment of "English-only"
laws in a number of states by referendum, with "[t]he margins of victory [being] usually
overwhelming." Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24
HARv C.R.-C.L. L. REv 293, 293 (1989). Congress has also considered an "English-only"
bill. Id. at 303-05. Nativism and xenophobia against immigrants are part of American history,
and the "English-only" movement could be said to be the most recent manifestation of
prejudice. See id. at 325-30. But see Barringer, A Land of Immigrants Gets Uneasy About
Immigration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1990, at E4, col. I (scholars disagree about intensity of
nativism and hostility towards U.S. immigrants in 1980s).
8. For a short list, see Gordon, Law and Disorder, 64 IND. L.J. 803 (1989) [hereinafter
Gordon, Disorder]; Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L.
Ray 2152 (1989); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter Mich-
elman, Law's Republic]; Reich, Law and Consciousness, 10 CAPDozo L. REV 77 (1988); West,
The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMi L. REv 531 (1988) [hereinafter
West, Authoritarian Impulse].
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10. West, Authoritarian Impulse, supra note 8; Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8,
at 1494-99. This use of the word "authoritarian" may reflect the concerns of liberal-progressive
scholars with the Reagan administration's political agenda of reconstituting the federal judiciary
to conform to a particular "conservative" political vision. The lack of sympathy for progressive
or liberal legal arguments a number of the new judges have manifested has reinforced these
concerns. Charles Reich has written:
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court mark the rise of an authoritarian
junsprudence-authoritarian in its processes and in the results. This authoritarian
jurisprudence is consistent with the goals pursued for the last eight years by the
Reagan Administration: to select for the federal bench only those judicial can-
didates with a demonstrated lack of empathy, absence of understanding of or
sympathy for the powerless, and a conscigusness that is narrowly limited to their
own position in the social hierarchy.
Reich, supra note 8, at 80. Brisbin has also criticized the statism of the Reagan judiciary.
Brisbin, supra note 4, at 528.
The rise in concern about authoritarianism does appear to correspond to changes in the
[Vol. 66:379
A UTHORITARIANISM
the significance of authoritarianism as a separate influence on law and legal
thinking. Accordingly, this Article explores authoritarianism in detail, ex-
amming the ways in which legal thought and constitutional jurisprudence
in particular serve to reinforce authoritarianism, while also being authori-
tarian in their own right. It seeks to describe and explore current authon-
taran manifestations in American constitutional law, as embodied in legal
scholarship and decisions of the Supreme Court. This Article assumes that,
for the most part, our practice includes deference and obedience to the
authority of judicial decisions, as well as reliance on them in political
discourse, and that accordingly, these decisions can and do play a role in
the creation and support of authoritarianism." Because the judiciary plays
a.significant role in determining who "loses his freedom, his property, his
children, even his life,' 2 because the focus of much legal scholarship is on
the courts, and because what judges decide counts as law, this Article will
focus on legal scholarship about the judiciary and its relation to authon-
tanamsm, examinng authoritarian models of judicial decisionmaking in
terms of both process and substance.
Although there is considerable literature on authority, legal authority and
"legitimate" authority, 3 Anglo-American jurisprudential and legal literature
concerning authoritarianism itself appears to be sparse; authoritarianism is
often viewed as the opposite of authority.14 Rather than struggle to properly
define what authority is, this Article argues that it may be more useful to
consider what authoritarianism-generally viewed as a perversion of
membership of the Supreme Court (and the federal courts generally) during the Reagan
administration, an administration that had not only a conservative, but arguably authoritarian
vision of law and legal process across almost every dimension. That is, President Reagan
appointed judges who would interpret or apply existing law to achieve the political goals of
dismantling affirmative action, prohibiting abortion, eradicating procedural protections for
criminal defendants and so on, goals that the admimstration had been unable to achieve by
appeal to the other "political" branch-Congress. Gary L. Bauer, a domestic policy advisor
to President Reagan and a leading conservative, has indicated that Reagan "has been able to
appoint many Federal judges whose rulings could eventually make policy of views that
conservatives were not able to push through Congress," including abolishing affirmative action
and abortion. Roberts, Reagan's Social Issues: Gone but Not Forgotten, N.Y. Times, Sept.
11, 1988, at E4, col. 4 (paraphrasing Bauer).
11. See Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARv. L. Rv.
1109, 1209-36 (1989) (discussing the hegemomc function of law and legal discourse in the
treatment of labor issues in the United States prior to the passage of the Wagner Act).
12. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Cover,
Violence].
13. See, e.g., AuTmorry: NOMOS I (C. Friedrich 1958); AuTorry nvisrrED: NOMOS
XXIX (J. Pennock & J. Chapman 1987); J. RAz, TaE Atroirrr OF LAW (1979) [hereinafter
J. RAz, Aumrorry]; J. RAz, THE MoRAarry oF FREEDOM (1986) [hereinafter J. RAz, MoRALrry];
R. SENNET-, AuTror= (1980).
14. See J. VImoG, THE AuTHomiTATrTE AND TH AuTmorrARL4.N (1986); see also infra
notes 39-51, 139-43 and accompanying text.
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authority-means. 5 "Authoritarian" and "authoritarianism" do not mean
conservative, right-wing, fascist or communist; rather, these words describe
a continuum of relationships to, and uses of, authority Authoritarianism
may simply mean unquestioning obedience to authority, "blind" obedience,
or, as Hannah Arendt defined the term, obedience to traditionally consti-
tuted authorities out of an attitude of acceptance. 6 But authoritarian and
authoritarianism also are used to describe personal epistemologies and
political structures and practices that are directly threatening to human
freedom and dignity Legal scholars may have had this substantive meaning
in mind when they referred to the Court's decisions as authoritarian. 7
Substantive authoritarianism means opposition to the "liberal" values of
tolerance of ambiguity and difference, insistence on obedience to rules,
insistence on conformity, and use of coercion and punishment to ensure
that obedience. Frequently associated with xenophobic nationalism or eth-
nocentrism, s authoritarianism in the substantive sense is premised on a
suspicious and distrustful view of human nature and is frequently linked,
both on a personal and political level, to racism, anti-semitism and patri-
archy 19 Substantive authoritarianism oppresses in the name of order and
control. This form of authoritarianism may reach the extreme level it did
in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia or appear m milder forms, as it did
during the McCarthy era in the United States, when, as a result of fear,
hatred and extreme nationalism, the government, with private and judicial
support, used law to persecute and punish citizens for being "un-Ameri-
can." 20
Authoritarianism need not be based only in active coercion and oppression
of disfavored groups by government. The government may also allow
authoritarianism to flourish by ormssion-by permitting other institutions
or persons to coerce and oppress others in the interest of maintaining
control. Thus, much of the history of slavery in the United States could be
characterized as government authoritarianism by omission in the interests
15. Cf. Shklar, Giving Injustice Its Due, 98 YALE L.J. 1135 (1989) (understandings of
justice may be aided by understanding its opposite).
16. Arendt, What Was Authority?, in AuTHoiurv: NOMOS I, supra note 13, at 81, 82.
17. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at 1520-24; Luban, supra note 8,
at 2165-86.
18. A. PERLMuTaR, MODERN AuTHoprtuR IsM 79-81 (1981).
19. See infra notes 85-86, 108-110 and accompanying text.
20. See S. LEPsET, PoLIcAL MA 169-73 (1981). For a description of the McCarthy era,
see V NATAVSKY, NAmiG NAsams (1980). See also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)
(Smith Act membership clause upheld); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (upholding registration requirement of Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) (upholding
dismissal of employee for refusing to answer congressional committee on grounds of "insub-
ordination"); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding convictions under Smith
Act).
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of maintaining order and national and party unity.2 Other examples include
the government largely ignoring oppression of and violence against African-
American women," and a long history of governmental tolerance of private
oppression of women and children through violence.?
Because law is a majoi tool of social and political power, and because it
is the primary instrument for a government to legitimate itself and accom-
plish its objectives, law is vulnerable to "capture" for substantively au-
thoritarian purposes. Law may always be authoritarian in the formal sense,
because a major premise of law is that people will accept and obey it absent
some extraordinary justification.24 Yet, a jurisprudential preoccupation with
the duty to obey law and the authority of law25 overlook law's tendency to
validate and facilitate oppression and violence, whether by the state directly
or by private actors with tacit state approval. Judges may participate in
authoritarian uses of law by unquestioning obedience to rule and other
authorities, by using stereotypical reasoning, by upholding the status quo
and hypostatizing power relationships, and by taking a punishing attitude
towards disobedience.? As Robert Cover noted and .David Luban recently
argued, the Supreme Court, in the case of Walker v. City of Birmingham,27
21. For an excellent summary of the interests in avoiding confrontations over slavery and
of the omissions to do anything to end the practice within the context of racism and xenophobia,
see J. McPamsoN, BATTLE CRY oF FREEDOM 490-510 (1988).
22. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cm.
LEOAL F 139, 157-60.
23. See Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issues of Separation,
43 STAN. L. REv. - (1991) (forthcoming); Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem
of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F 23.
24. For a formally authoritarian description of the insider's view of legal authority, see
Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim of Authority, 18 PEn. & PuB. AFF. 209 (1989).
25. As examples of the continuing argument that people must obey the law absent some
extraordinary reason, see K. GREEKAWALT, CoNFLCTs OF LAW AND MonAurr (1987); Soper,
supra note 24, at 212-13, 224, 229 (suggesting it is moral to obey the law); see also Henderson,
Whose Nature? Practical Reason and Patriarchy, 38 CLEv. ST. L. REv. - (1990) (forth-
coming) [hereinafter Henderson, Whose Nature?] (discussing John Finms' theory of the morality
of obedience to authority).
26. For articles describing authoritarian judicial practices, see Luban, supra note 8; Forbath,
supra note 11; Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative]. Robert Gordon has written
in a humorous way that late nineteenth century legal scholars
somehow persuaded themselves that the legal reinforcement of free contracting
did not implicate the coercive power of the state. Of course a party who
relies on legal enforcement is not engaging in a private transaction in the sense
that an agreement to have lunch is a private transaction. If things go wrong,
he hopes to have the option of having his interpretation of the, deal backed up
by state force-up to and including the 101st Airborne Division or National
Guard if defendant resists enforcement.
Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. Ray 195,
213 (1987) (footnote omitted).
27. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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engaged in authoritarian decisionmaking by holding that civil rights marchers
could be pumshed for disobeying an injunction the Court had declared
unconstitutional. Professor Luban concluded that the Court in Walker,
"[flacing a choice between the anti-authoritarian consequences of liberal
constitutionalism and the overwhelming desire to maintain reverence for
authority, . . opted for the latter. ' 2
With the decline of liberal thought and politics in the United States,
much of the constitutional jurisprudence of the 1980s has become particu-
larly facilitative of authoritarian uses of law by providing theoretical justi-
fications for those uses. A distrust of judges and judicial power exercised
in a certain liberating way has been the target of some "conservative"
scholars. Thus, arguments by conservative constitutional scholars invariably
seek to curtail the ability of judges to interpret positive law by demanding
obedience to law, narrowly defined. The demand on the part of some
scholars for strict adherence to original intent, obedience to text, deference
to the political branches-particularly the executive branch-and strict fi-
delity to precedent and stare decisis, combined with arguments emphasizing
stability, order, predictability and control, is especially troubling. To the
extent that such positivist views of judging can be associated with authon-
taran legal systems, these arguments can legitimate tyranny. To the extent
that adherence to text and legislative command renders judges powerless to
prevent legally constructed oppression or repression, the likelihood of formal
authoritarianism in law, at a mimmum, increases. 29
Other scholars make more substantively authoritarian arguments. Judge
Posner's visions of human nature, law and the need for acceptance of
authority have been criticized elsewhere as being authoritarian ° and will be
criticized here as well. Additionally, some commumtarian or civic republican
scholars present the danger of substantive authoritariamsm. For these scho-
lars, community and public virtue take priority in law; one does not have
to be an atomistic, selfish liberal to be concerned that arguments that
the community takes precedence provide a justification for "aggressive
28. Luban, supra note 8, at 2185-86.
29. Although emphasis on obedience to rules or texts can sometimes restrain a judge from
approving an authoritarian practice or reaching an authoritarian result, obedience to authority
cannot be said to be neutral or even necessarily good. The outcome of obedience depends on
the goodness or badness of the authority, the oppressive or liberating effects of a rule. For
example, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989),
professes obedience to precedent and the perceived command of the first amendment in
reaching what could be considered a non-authoritanan result-concluding that a state cannot
regulate or pumsh the political expression of burning the flag of the United States. But four
other justices disagreed both as to the content of the rule and precedent and with the result.
Rules and obedience will never bind judges in the way that many scholars assume, and
arguments for obedience may be used to support authoritarian outcomes as easily as non-
authoritarian outcomes. See infra notes 252-86 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 287-88.
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majoritanamsm' 13 and repressive, punitive or oppressive uses of law against
outsiders.
There are, however, some avenues of scholarship that exist or are being
explored which could combat the tendency to use law in authoritarian ways.
In the conclusion of this Article, I will suggest that there are at least two
major alternatives to authoritanan legal thought which are consistent both
with legality and with humanitarian systems. My choice of these alternatives
is based not only on the fact that they are at least descriptively and
theoretically inconsistent with authoritarianism, but also on the existence of
empirical evidence suggesting the value of these approaches in combatting
authoritarianism. These two alternatives are the jurisprudence of strong
rights and individual human dignity32 and the fermst/nunority/humarust
jurisprudence of understanding and care for others.3 These two orientations
somewhat resemble the different models of moral decisionmaking developed
by Kohlberg and Gilligan; rather than being seen as antagonistic, the models
might very well be capable of combination, as suggested by the writings of
some scholars. 34 These approaches both share the similar concerns of valuing
human beings and of resisting cruelty, subordination and oppression, in
whatever guise.
I. AuTHoRARANIsM AND ITS RELATION TO LAW
This section examines authoritarianism in more detail and develops a
description of authoritarianism in relation to law. It begins with a very
brief summary of the literature on authority, noting that even in this
literature the connection between authority and authoritarianism is often
31. This felicitous phrase is Suzanna Sherry's. See Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 614 (1986).
32. See, e.g., R. DwoRyiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); R. UNGER, THE CmcAL
LEGAL STUDIES MovEMENT (1986).
33. While the ethic of care is associated with the work of feminist legal scholars, it is not
confined to femimst jurisprudence. See, e.g., K. KARST, BELONGING TO AmERiCA (1989); Bender,
A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987) [hereinafter Henderson, Legality];
Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV.
10 (1987); West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REy. 867
(1988) [hereinafter West, One Contrast].
34. For a moral philosopher's discussion of the Kantian ethic and the ethic of care, see
L. BLum, FRiuaNsmp, ALTRUiSM, AND MORA= (1980); Blum, Gilligan and Kohlberg: Impli-
cations for Moral Theory, 98 ETIcs 472 (1988). For scholarship drawing both on notions of
rights and on notions of responsiveness and understanding, see Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987);
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. RE, 317 (1987); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HAxv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987) [hereinafter Matsuda, Reparations];
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MicH. L.
REv. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech].
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present. It then examines in more detail the literature on authoritarianism
and begins to describe how the literature might relate to law. Next, the
section examines more thoroughly the relation of authoritarianism to law,
first generally and then through the writings of scholars who have been
concerned with the relationship of law and authoritarianism.
A. Why Authority?
A posited human "need" for authority has led to numerous attempts to
define or describe authority-hence, "legitimate" authority-and to distin-
guish it from authoritarianism. Yet, often unstated assumptions about
human nature and the need for authority arising from those assumptions
influence the definitions of authority used by scholars. These assumptions
themselves may be based on authoritarian beliefs, and appear across a broad
range of the literature on authority, including philosophy and the social
sciences.
A common justification of the human need for authority relationships
has been that of a parent to a child.3 5 Thus, a common argument for
authority and the requirement of obedience to authority is that the child's
obedience to her parents is natural and essential for her well-being. As true
as it is that young humans are neither physically nor. cognitively able to
survive by themselves in even simple worlds, an emphasis on the child's
obedience rather than on the parents' nuturance and education of their
children in itself manifests an authoritarian view of human nature. As the
child grows older and develops cognitive, experiential and emotional skills,
absolute obedience to parental authority is neither biologically required nor
healthy for the child in a liberal democratic society. The wise parent
recognizes the developing child and loosens the bonds of authority accord-
ingly 36 The authoritarian family, as embodied in the classic Victonan
patriarchal family, with its emphasis on the wicked child and obedience to
a father who was a "full-bodied authoritarian, who took his particular
morality very seriously and threatened and/or delivered extreme punishment
for 'moral' waywardness ' 3 7 creates a rigid and punitive personal morality
that emphasizes obedience to authority Under the authoritarian view that
stresses authority as primary in the family, the parents impose a narrow
and conventional morality on the child. They are repressive, punitive and
35. See, e.g., R. SENNETT, supra note 13, at 15; Arendt, supra note 16, at 81, 97.
36. Cf. E. SAGAN, FREUD, WOam AND MoRAIrrY 160-94 (1988) (suggesting that loving
and nurtunng children is important to the development of conscience and moral autonomy
and moral capacity).
37 A. MILLER, FOR YouR OWN GOOD 4-6 (2d ed. 1984); E. SAGAN, supra note 36, at 57.
See generally Lifton & Strozier, Waiting for Armageddon, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1990, § 7
(Book Review), at 1, col. 1.
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require absolute obedience to parental authority, whether it is for the child's
well-being or not. Tyrannizing children with physical punishments and
refusing to recognize their individual humanity can render them incapable
of individual moral autonomy and empathy for others, and may also increase
their capability for cruelty to themselves and others.3"
The authoritarian parenting model hardly seems a worthy justification
-for a posited need for authority, although it might very well produce those
prone to adopt authoritarian approaches to life. Similarly, the human search
for, or belief in, a transcendental Being also has been posited as proof of
a need for authority. Even if beliefs and religions serve a basic human
desire for connection to a greater Being or reassurance against the anxiety
of death and meaninglessness, those that terrorize their adherents by being
rigid and punitive-authoritarian, in other words-do not, however, seem
to merit emulation.
Nonetheless, it seems indisputable that these common authoritarian ar-
rangements reinforce attitudes about the perceived need for authority
Although authoritarian backgrounds or religions can produce morally au-
tonomous individuals, they are more likely to produce authoritarians who
willingly obey rules, punish those who deviate from rules, and defend the
primacy of authority for ordering human affairs. As a matter of speculation,
the vast majority of us may have been sufficiently shaped by authoritarian
upbringing and practices that we have all absorbed a belief in a natural
human need for authority, at either a conscious or unconscious level. And,
to the extent that we are shaped by a belief in the necessity of authority
and are accustomed to authority, it may be difficult (if not impossible) to
break away from thinking that something in human nature requires authority
and punishment for defiance of authority.
Arendt made a different, more subtle argument about this posited need
for authority that may capture another reason why we seek authority
Authority, for Arendt, was grounded in traditions and "gave the world the
permanence and durability which human beings need precisely because they
are mortals-the most unstable and futile beings we know of."3 9 Although
Arendt made this point in 1958, before the current concern with post-
modernism, the post-modern threat of groundlessness was in part the subject
of Arendt's essay. For many of us, outside guides, authorities and commands
do shelter us from the anxiety of uncertainty and the reality of our own
death, appearing to give us a guide to a meaningful, well-regarded life. But
authority may simply fulfill the function of other needs; it is not a need in
38. See A. MIULER, supra note 37, at 8-9; S. OLINER & P OxM4ER, THE ALTXuIsric
PERSONALITy 179-85 (1988) (describing the difference in childreanng practices of parents of
those non-Jewish individuals who helped rescue or aid Jews in Nazi Europe); E. SAGAN, supra
note 36, at 209-10 (psychodynamic interpretations).
39. Arendt, supra note 16, at 112.
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and of itself. It may be that when we are most threatened with death
anxiety we seek authority or certainty and are vulnerable to authoritarianism.
The more chaos seems to threaten us, the more rigid we may become. 40 If
it is true that authority serves to shelter us from uncertainty, death anxiety,
meaningless or groundlessness, perhaps we should address those issues rather
than abdicating our responsibility for ourselves and others by deferring to
authority
Scholars have had difficulty defimng authority in contrast to other guides
to human behavior and choice. Authority has been defined as commum-
cation capable of "reasoned elaboration, ' 41 tradition 42 and "rational consent
of agents to obey rules and officials installed according to proper
procedures." 43 It is that which serves as a "preemptive" reason for acting-
a person obeys even if the authority is, in her own judgment, mistaken. A
person "treats [authority] as . a reason for judging or acting in the
absence of understood reasons, or for disregarding at least some reasons
which . . would in the absence of the [authority] have sufficed to justify
proceeding in some other way "44 Authority is power and violence for some,
although others dispute that connection.4 1 It is the ordering of existence
through rules, 46 or it is "an attempt to interpret the conditions of power." 47
One author, who has recognized the threat of authoritarianism latent in
authonty, sought to insulate authority from authoritarianism by defining
"rightly instituted" authority as "a mode of coordination that treats indi-
viduals with the respect due them without requiring each to possess an
impossibly high degree of knowledge about every sector of social life or an
unreasonably high level of civic virtue." It is "an appropriate mode of
coordination ' 48 for accomplishing things in large, pluralistic societies. John
Finnis has argued that in order for human groups to achieve any coordi-
nation in pursuing common goals, "[t]here must be either unanimity, or
authority ,,49 Although his definition of authority resembles that of a
necessary coordinating device, his claim about the need for authority is
more absolute. His assertion that human groups cannot accomplish anything
40. See Connolly, Modern Authority and Ambiguity, in AUTHORITY REVISITED: NOMOS
XXIX, supra note 13, at 9, 17-19, 22.
41. Friedrich, Authority, Reason, and Discretion, in AtrHORITY: NOMOS I, supra note
13, at 28, 29.
42. Arendt, supra note 16, at 112 (authority grounded in past).
43. Connolly, supra note 40, at 13.
44. J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 234 (1980) (emphasis in original)
(adapting Joseph Raz's definition); see J. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 13, at 38-49.
45. Hardin, Does Might Make Right? in AUTHORITY REVISITED: NOMOS XXIX, supra
note 13, at 215; Ball, Authority and Conceptual Change, in id. at 41, 52-54.
46. Jones, On Authority: Or, Why Women are not Entitled to Speak, in id. at 152, 153.
47 R. SENNETT, supra note 13, at 19.
48. Connolly, supra note 40, at 19.
49. J. FiNis, supra note 44, at 232.
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without obeying authority or having absolute agreement suggests a suspicious
view of human nature. Finnis does appear to exclude from the realm of
possibility other human solutions to coordinating problems.5 0 Yet, human
culture is too rich and diverse to leave us with the stark options of absolute
agreement or absolute deference to authority.5'
Whatever the definition of authority, however, the absence of authority
is frequently asserted as the equivalent of social chaos-anarchy, in the
negative sense, on a scale of the Reign of Terror-because of beliefs about
the way humans are: individuals pursuing their own ends to the exclusion
of others, individuals full of anti-social, wicked aggressions that must be
repressed.52 As one author has observed, claims about the need for authority
are often grounded in a vision of human behavior as "intrinsically bellicose"
and conflict-riddled; if this is true, "[tihe rules of authority . . provide
sanctuary from the dangers of social intercourse. 53 A belief in the violence
of human nature and the "consequent need for social regulation ' 54 has led
many social theorists to assert the need for authority, order and, control;
yet as anthropologist Renato Rosaldo observes, analysts seldom examine
the causes of social violence and chaos. Instead, "chaos appears more as a
trope for use in debate[,] . . an only half-revealed threat of 'what would
happen if . . .,,5" Further, "[tihe vision of chaos following the collapse
of the sociocultural order induces a feeling of panic," because the nature
of such a collapse is left nightmanshly vague. 6 Indeed, the terror at the
prospect of chaos may lead to a desire for rigid control, increasing the
likelihood of authority becoming authoritarian.
Arguments regarding the necessity for authority, from social chaos or
from permanence, beg the question of whether authority itself is a need or
whether it is a functional adaptation to fill other needs. While it is true
that we probably are better off having some coordination or agreement on
things such as on which side of the road to drive, it does not necessarily
follow that authority, rather than custom, tradition, habit or practice, is
necessary to this end. It is certainly not clear that humans by nature (rather
than because of culture) must have coercive authority to accomplish coor-
dination.
In much the same manner as argument from presupposed needs for
authority and the threat of social chaos, legal authority becomes a necessary
50. This point is developed in Henderson, Whose Nature?, supra note 25.
51. See R. ROsALDO, CuLTuRE AND TRuTH (1989) (cultural anthropologist's analysis sug-
gesting humans improvise and influence culture, including adjusting to contingencies and
coordinating responses).
52. See supra notes 35-38.
53. Jones, supra note 46, at 157
54. R. RosALo, supra note 51, at 99.
55. Id. at 100.
56. Id.
1991]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
premise for scholars, rather than being a phenomenon that fulfills certain
functions (and, tautologically, legitimate authority is legal authority, which
tells us nothing about the goodness or badness of the authority). To the
extent that we have not abandoned the belief, "usually attributed to Hobbes,
that without regulative norms people become pathologically violent, ' 57 law
becomes unquestionably necessary because law is the way to keep 'every-
body from tearing everybody to bits."' 58 This vision, in turn, fosters
authoritarian attitudes toward law.
B. The Meaning of Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism has at least two different meanings: one simply of
unquestioning obedience to authority, and one of obedience combined with
the use of authority to repress, punish and oppress human beings. Obedience
to authority itself might best be described as formal authoritariamsm-it is
solely concerned with the process of identifying authoritative commands or
directions and then following them. Substantive authoritarianism, on the
other hand, not only entails the process of obeying commands or rules, but
also involves oppression and punishment.
Hannah Arendt argued that formal authoritarianism was justified. 9 To
Arendt, authoritarianism meant obedience to legitimate authority and hi-
erarchy as a matter of acceptance of traditionally constituted, past authority.
She defended traditional modes of willing authoritarian obedience, arguing
that authority by definition was based on legitimate power. The power was
legitimate because it had been "assumed and 'proven' by . a source
beyond or above the ruler." 6° Legitimacy originated "outside the range of
human deeds, ' ' 6' either because it sprang from a transcendent source, or
because the human sources had existed in the past. Authority provided
permanence, stability and certainty 62 Authority transcended both power and
those individuals holding power; 63 resort to coercion or force meant that
authority. had failed.64 Thus, authoritarianism signified obedience to au-
thority out of acceptance, not because of reason, coercion or fear. 65
Arendt's belief in the need for authority led her to distinguish authon-
tanan structures from totalitarian structures in order to protect governmental
and social systems that she respected, as well as to defend against what she
57 Rosaldo, While Making Other Plans, 58 S. CAL. L. R~v 19, 26 (1985).
58. Id. (quoting H. SuLLmA, THE INTERPERsONAL THmORY OF PsYcmAmY 213-14 (1953)).
59. Arendt, supra note 16, at 81.
60. Id. at 83.
61. Id. at 82-83.
62. Id. at 112.
63. Id. at 110.
64. Id. at 82.
65. Id.
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saw as the regrettable modern decline in authority from critique arising
from the extreme authoritarianism of Nazi Germany and Stalimst Russia.
For Arendt, as long as authoritarian governments did not do away with
human freedom entirely, they were not tyrannical and were not to be
condemned. Authoritarian systems-systems that contained a complex of
demands for obedience-were acceptable to Arendt; she argued that
"[h]istoncally, . . authoritarian forms of rule did not wish to abolish, but
to limit freedom, and these limitations were felt necessary to protect and
safeguard liberty.""6
In instances of obedience to a benign authority, there are not many
serious problems in Arendt's definition of authoritarianism: authoritarianism
is hardly a pejorative term if the accepted authority is good. Obedience to
good rules or authorities, even if they are grounded in the past and even
if the obedience is grudging or unwilling, in many instances is morally better
than disobedience. Thus, it is better to obey the command not to murder
even if one feels homicidal impulses toward a person than to, disobey;
obedience to traffic rules-a frequently used example of the need for
authority-makes more sense than disobedience. But this observation does
not establish that authority per se is good or that it is necessary in all
instances. Even obedience to a good rule may have unfortunate effects, and
simultaneous obedience to several good rules may be impossible. 67
Arendt's defense of traditional sources of authority should not strike legal
scholars as unfamiliar or strange. Much of law is based on following
traditions and respecting legal authority and process. Undoubtedly, most
lawyers believe that law is necessary to the ordering of human affairs, and
some believe that respect for legal authority is essential to human happiness
and moral behavior. Therefore, the legal actor generally accepts legal
authority as good, although she may dispute particular exercises of that
authority. The precepts of that authority are followed and obeyed and
defended- out of this acceptance. 6 Arendt made the observation that the
founding fathers and the Constitution, as sources of authority, played the
same role in the United States as the founding of Rome had played for the
authoritarian Roman empire. 69 Similarly, a number of constitutional scholars
and judges have argued that the source for authority is in the past-in the
founding constitutional moment, the super-human, parental qualities of the
drafters and the text.70 Because the authority of the founding moment is
good, the Constitution's authority is good. The goodness of the founders
66. Id. at 83.
67. For an elaboration of tins point, see Henderson, Whose Nature?, supra note 25.
68. See West, Authoritarian Impulse, supra note 8, at 531.
69. Arendt, supra note 16, at 109-10; see also Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8,
at 1515-16 (summarizing Hanna Pitkia's characterization of the founding moment).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 208-39.
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becomes the goodness of the Constitution; the authority of the Constitution
therefore must never be challenged because it is good. Although this
argument conflates legal and moral norms and simply makes the legal the
right and the good, it is not an unfamiliar posture. Rather, it resembles
Arendt's description of the role of the founding moment in authoritarian
systems.
The argument for uncritical acceptance of authority can quickly lead to
more severe forms of authoritarianism. As soon as uncritical acceptance of
and obedience to authority become the norm, the accepted authority has
the power to oppress, to punish, to repress and to dominate. For example,
the well-known Milgram studies provide a chilling example of authority's
power to command obedient persons to inflict pain on others in order to
punish them .7 Arendt sought to preserve the value of obedience to authority
by distinguishing authoritarianism from totalitarianism, but even authori-
tananism in her formal sense-obeying because the authority is accepted by
tradition and practice-can quickly become authoritarianism in a substan-
tive, negative sense. While her distinction between totalitarian and author-
itarian illustrates a point on a continuum that ranges from benign or
humanistic authority to gulags or death camps, unfortunately the distinction
has deflected attention from description and analysis of repressive regimes
that are not totalitarian, that is, completely dominant over their citizenry.7 2
For example, the United States government used Arendt's distinction to
legitimate a difference in policies toward brutal right-wing regimes and those
on the left, thereby muddying the point that some authoritarian governments
are more repressive in more ways than others, whether they are right-wing
dictatorships such as the Pinochet regime in Chile, or communist dictator-
ships such as the Romanian regime of Ceausecu.7
Accordingly, the term authoritarian has taken on a different connotation
in much political and psychological writing, one that is negative and critical.
In this context, authoritarianism embodies specific combinations of personal,
group and political orientations and outcomes. In some ways, authoritari-
anism is a difficult concept because so often it is more of a tone or
orientation rather than an easily identifiable category of definitive traits or
characteristics. Further, authoritarian refers both to an individual's use of
and attitude toward authority as well as to particular political structures
71. S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHOR=TY (1974) (describing experimental studies which
test an individual's willingness to obey authority even when she believes she is inflicting pain
on the experimental subject; generalizing from evidence that obedience to a perceived authority
might explain the willingness of "moral" people to commit atrocities on others; Milgram
suggests that the problem is authority, not authoritarianism).
72. Amos Perlmutter has termed the distinction "unproductive" both descriptively and
analytically in analyzing political systems. See A. PERLMUTTER, supra note 18, at 62-71.
73. The distinction was stressed by Jeanne Kirkpatrick to offer a reason for U.S. support
of oppressive right-wing dictatorships. M. FRENCH, BEYOND POWER 340 (1985).
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with many of the same characteristics. Generally, however, the authoritarian
world-view holds a vision of human beings as monsters; this vision pervades
its justifications for authority, control, punishment, and obedience. 74 Au-
thoritarian systems and individuals may be more or less repressive, punitive
and hostile to certain beliefs, activities or groups. They may be leftist or
right-wing in their ideologies and politics, but they nevertheless share some
common characteristics.
Perhaps as a result of the history of the United States and the original
concerns of researchers, right-wing authoritarianism has been the primary
focus of research on authoritarian movements in this country and on the
authoritarian personality.75 For example, Professor Lipset has argued that,
historically, the authoritarian political orientation in the United States has
been a combination of social conservatism and nativism with nineteenth-
century visions of laissez-faire economics. 76 In the United States, authori-
tarian movements have been associated with traditional moralism, support
for the status quo, the belief in the necessity of maintaining order, an
emphasis on obedience to government as essential to avoid anarchy, and
antipathy toward new ideas. 77
Similarly, concern with right-wing movements was the impetus for research
on the authoritarian individual. The notion of the authoritarian personality7
was developed by some members of the Frankfurt school in exile in the
United States as part of an effort to understand what influenced the rise
of naziism and anti-semitism in Germany. 79 The notion of the authoritarian
personality still has descriptive force, although interest and research support
virtually disappeared during the Cold War era. 0 Although there has been
much dispute about the psychodynamic interpretations of the authors, the
validity of the usual instrument used to measure "authoritarian" personality
(the F-scale)8' and other portions of the study, subsequent studies and
measures have resulted in similar descriptions of what constitutes an au-
thoritarian orientation. According to a number of studies, the authoritarian
74. H. KELmAN & V HAMILTON, CRIES OF OBEDMNCE 23-52 (1989). I do not intend to
say here that humans are incapable of behaving like monsters; such a claim would be silly as
well as false. The irony is that such monsters are so often obeying an authority and have
injected authoritarian values. See S. MGRAM, supra note 71.
75. S. LsETr & E. R., Tim Pourcs OF UaNPAsoN 3-4 (2d ed. 1978).
76. S. Ln'sET, supra note 20, at 169, 432-33.
77. S. Lu'sEr & E. RAA, supra note 75, at 7-20.
78. See T. ADoaRio, E. F.ENKEL-BRuNswnIc, D. LEvNsoN & R. SAnoD, THE AuHoiu-
TARiAN PERsoNAnrrY (abr. ed. 1982) [hereinafter THE AUTHO=rrARN PERsONALrTy].
79. Id. at vii, xiii, 1-11.
80. Samelson, Authoritartantsm from Berlin to Berkeley: On Social Psychology and History,
42 J. Soc. Issurs 191 (1986).
81. Kelman and Hamilton, for example, criticize the "format and wording of items" used
in the F-scale, where "the authoritarian response to each item is also the 'agree' response."
H. KELmAN & V HAmILTON, supra note 74, at 279.
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individual values and follows rules. She is rigid, inflexible and intolerant of
difference.12 The prototypical authoritarian person has a low tolerance for
ambiguity, adopts conventional behaviors and beliefs and is prone to neg-
ative stereotypy Authoritarians may be cynical, distrustful, intolerant, mor-
alistic, anti-democratic and nationalistic. 3 Authoritarians are unlikely to
have much empathy for the suffering or pain of others" and are likely to
be prejudiced against racial, religious and ethmc "outgroups."8 3 Further,
authoritarians tend to support patriarchal beliefs, prejudices and stereotypes
about women and sexuality 86
Authoritarians obey and demand obedience to authority's commands
simply because they are commands, and they hold a harshly punitive attitude
toward those who do not comply 87 The authoritarian does not hold inde-
pendent judgments about the goodness or value of rules and finds challenges
to rules or settled understandings deeply threatening. The authoritarian
individual obeys authority either to escape punishment or because she has
thoroughly introjected-made a part of her identity-the authoritative def-
inition of her status and role."8 Thus, strict compliance with rules can arise
either from fear or introjection of authority Erich Fromm posited that the
authoritarian masochistically obeys those hierarchically above her and sa-
distically punishes those beneath her or deviant from her, whether she is
conscious of the sado-masochistic dynamic or not; obeying and pleasing
the authority is the most important goal for the authoritarian. 9 The
82. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREnDICE 395-409 (25th ann. ed. 1979); S. OLRNER &
P OLINER, supra note 38, at 255-59; cf. A. MrLER, supra note 37; E. SAGAN, supra note 36
(psychoanalytic/dynamic descriptions).
83. S. LIPSET, supra note 20, at 476-88.
84. G. ALLORT, supra note 82, at 434-36; S. OLINER & P OLINER, supra note 38, at 174.
85. The authors of The Authoritarian Personality found a strong correlation between
ethnocentrism and authoritarianism in their study. See Tim AuTrorrAu, N PERSONALITY, supra
,note 78, at 193-94, 353-73. See generally G. ALLPORT, supra note 82.
86. See Henderson, Whose Nature?, supra note 25.
87 For example, several studies have found a correlation between authoritarian attitudes
and support for capital punishment in the United States. See Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth,
The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality
of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV 53, 69 (1984) (vanables significantly predicting first
ballot votes in a simulated jury study were the "Legal Authoritarianism" score and the attitude
toward the death penalty; the two attitudes were highly intercorrelated); Thompson, Cowan,
Ellsworth & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness, 8 LAw & HUM.
BEHAv 95, 97 (1984) (summarizing research); H. VrDmAR & P ELISWORTa, PuBLic OPINION
AND TH DEATH PENALTY 1260-61 & n.78 (1974) (discussing research on the relationship of
authoritarianism to intolerance and punitiveness).
88. E. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 180, 186-89 (1969); H. KEmMAN & V HAMILTON,
supra note 74, at 268, 317, 322.
89. E. FROMM, MAN FOR HIMSELF 148-59 (1947); E. FROMM, supra note 88, at 163-90; see
also McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in Trials with Political and
Racial Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoas. 205, 217 (1977) ("The
authoritarian is servile and obsequious in a subordinate position, but takes out all of his or
her pent-up hostility and frustration upon those perceived to be in violation of the conventional
norms of society.").
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authoritarian's emphasis on obedience enables her to persecute, torture or
oppress others- without guilt and perhaps even with pleasure at the behest
of the idealized or introjected authority 90 Authoritarians have the "[tlendency
to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and pumsh people who
violate conventional values."'" They reject "the subjective, the imaginative,
the tender-minded, ' 92 (meaning the compassionate); the authoritarian view
of human nature is negative and suspicious, in keeping with a Hobbesian
vision of the world.93
A more recent study suggests that authoritarians may fall into two general
categories. Rule authoritarians are those who obey political authority to
avoid pumshment but are generally alienated from authority; role authori-
tarians are those who obey out of a sense of obligation and identification
with their role in the state.94 "Rule orientation represents compliance with
power; role orientation, [moral] obligation to obey authority "95 The authors
found that both orientations to authority correlate.with those measures of
authoritarianism that have been devised.96 In terms of citizenship and
politics, rule-oriented authoritarans
see it as their task to follow the rules: to respect authorities' demands,
do what is required of them, and stay out of trouble. In return, they
expect the government to uphold the rules and thus protect their basic
interests and ensure societal order. . Role-oriented citizens, who iden-
tify with the nation and are involved in their roles within it, have a
higher set of expectations. They want to be and to perceive themselves
as good citizens who meet their role obligations by actively supporting
the government and faithfully obeying its demands. [T]hey expect
the government to uphold the integrity of their roles by ensuring ugh
status for the nation They support policies that contribute to
enhancing their sense of status.. 97
To the extent that they have a higher status and "tend to be caught up
in the workings of the authority structure," 9 the role-oriented authoritarians
can be quite supportive of and active in authoritarian oppression of others. 99
Thus it might be that role-oriented authoritarians, because they so often
hold positions of power or authority themselves, should be of greatest
concern, because they are also likely to be both actih'e and efficacious in
90. THE AuTmoRrrARm.N PERSONALrry, supra note 78, at 157, 361; E. Faomm, supra note
88, at 186-88.
91. THE Aum~omrrAmRAN PERSONALIrY, supra note 78, at 157.
92. Id. at 157.
93. Id. at 148.
94. H. KEUmAN & V HAMLTON, supra note 74, at 317.
95. Id. at 291.
96. Id. at 278-79.
97. Id. at 268.
98. Id. at 272.
99. Id. at 318.
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perpetuating oppression, subordination and punishment of despised groups.
Rule-oriented authoritarians are more compliant: "They do what is necessary
and no more'"1° and, although they obviously will cooperate with author-
itanan oppression, they may be less likely to initiate it.
In summary, then, the authoritarian individual is preoccupied with hier-
archy, power and obedience. Authoritarians are likely to be rigid, inflexible,
ethnocentric and punitive. Intolerance and distrust of anything different
and of human nature generally combine to capture a particular cluster of
orientations to authority and rules. In contrast, the anti-authoritarian tends
to be economically and socially egalitarian, trusting of others, tolerant,
flexible, empathic, non-stereotypical in thought, and ready to take moral
responsibility for choices and actions)10'
Authoritarian political systems are characterized by "repression, intoler-
ance, [and] encroachment on the private rights and freedoms of citizens."'12
Authoritarian governments take various forms and use various mechanisms
to assure state hegemony in society, with greater or lesser degrees of success.
Although such governments may depend on "centralized executive control
and coercion"'0 3 and the need for command and obedience, they do not
necessarily deny "constitutional authority, the Rule of Law and functional
representation." 0 4 Rather, the modern authoritarian state simply makes
order and stability, and thus obedience, its "absolute priority "101 Political
authoritarianism rejects strong or pluralistic forms of democracy, as well
as liberalism and democratic socialism, but it is not inconsistent with a
token form of democracy. To maintain an authoritarian regime, the leaders
must have mass support of and agreement with the system, because the
state cannot be maintained solely by coercive force at all times. 06 Competing
authorities must be co-opted or disabled, and power must be concentrated
in the state; therefore, authoritarian governments seek to dominate "by
arresting, subverting, or destroying autonomous individual, collective, and
institutional behavior."' 7 Further, and related to the authoritarian person-
ality, authoritarian governments arise from "radical nationalism; antiliber-
alism; antiparliamentarism; an antibourgeois ethos; and anti-Semitism and
racism." 08
100. Id. at 273.
101. THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY, supra note 78, at 475; H. KELMAN & V HAMILTON,
supra note 74, at 261-306.
102. A. PERLMUTrR, supra note 18, at 7-8.
103. Id. at 24.
104. Id. at 25.
105. Id.
106. Mass support or popular support may be coerced or courted, but modern authoritarian
governments need and rely on general support or acquiescence in order to consolidate their
power. See id., passim.
107 Id. at 25.
108. Id. at 78.
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The connection between the development of authoritarian government
and authoritarian personality, while not proven, is at least descriptively
useful: "[ajuthoritarianism is an orientation that is both cultural and struc-
tural."' 9 If a culture reproduces authoritarian attitudes, and its citizens are
raised to be authoritarians, there is little reason to believe that a regime
that is oppressive and intolerant cannot exist under the Rule of Law.
The above discussion of the authoritarian personality and the authoritarian
political state captures the paradigm of the authoritarian. Not every au-
thoritarian person or state necessarily has all of the traits associated with
the descriptions; persons with authoritarian personality characteristics can
be quite kind towards their friends and family or reference group, for
example, and authoritarian governments may tolerate some deviance, some
free speech, and so on. But recurring themes in all manifestations of
authoritarianism are an overriding concern with obedience to authority, its
directives and rules; an emphasis on order, predictability and stability; and
a punitive and suspicious attitude toward others. Historically and presently,
there appears to be some relationship between authoritarian government
and personality on the one hand, and racism and anti-semitism on the
other. There is some indication as well that authoritarian governments and
persons insist on the maintenance of patriarchy and male dominance. 110
The authoritarian attitude is learned and culturally defined, not innate.
Learned cultural attitudes toward authority affect attitudes toward one of
our most powerful primary references for authority, law In fact, oppressive,
or substantive, authoritarianism is probably meant by many legal scholars
when they refer to the authoritarian or to authoritarianism in their writ-
ings."' The orientation of a person or culture to the authority of law can
be as authoritarian as an orientation to military authority, parental authority
or religious authority, with equally good or bad results. The next section
discusses the implications that the authoritarian attitude holds for law
C. Authoritarianism and Law
It nught be that law and formal authoritarianism are always closely linked
and that much of legal thinking is conducive to authoritarianism. Formal
or substantive authoritarianism may be completely compatible with law
because of law's concern with rules, rule-following, hierarchies of authority,
109. Id. at 170.
I10. Id. at 85-88; THE AurTroa AiuN PERSONALrrY, supra note 78, at 191-94, 208; G.
ALLPORT, supra note 82, at 395-408; cf. M. FRENCH, supra note 73, at 345-56 (discussing
authoritarianism's relation to patriarchy).
II. Robert Gordon's article comparing the treatment of speech issues in the United States
and Great Britain is a good example of the use of the term in the sense described here.
Gordon, Disorder, supra note 8; vee also Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8.
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and its recourse to coercion to ensure obedience. Further, recurrent political
and scholarly concerns with obedience to law and the power of legal actors
to decide upon or to legislate punishments can quickly reinforce law's
relationship to authoritarianism. Finally, law and legality may be sources
of authority that are always at risk of becoming authoritarian in the
substantive sense, because law is interconnected with state and private forms
of power.
It should not be considered bizarre at this point to note that law and
politics are related or that law is a particular form of political practice, but
I do not intend to defend that proposition here.12 It should, however, be
obvious to legal scholars that law governs allocations of power among
persons and institutions, and power is the subject of politics.' The prox-
imity of law to state power and the invocation of the state's coercive
mechanisms, even in the so-called private law fields, are enough to support
the claim that law and state power are closely related. Law is also political
in that it helps to determine allocations of social power."14 Nevertheless,
some scholars resist the notion that authoritarianism and legal thinking are
related. Scholars have made arguments about law's inconsistency with
authoritarianism and also about the ability of the Rule of Law to protect
us from authoritarianism. Yet, neither set of arguments is entirely persuasive.
Despite our cultural assumption that the Rule of Law automatically
prevents tyranny and oppression-the bicentennial celebration of the Con-
stitution was notably silent about the fact that the original document
legitimated the enslavement of an entire race of people' '5-this section argues
that there is nothing intrinsic to the Rule of Law that prevents authoritar-
ianism. Indeed, there is a paradox present in the understanding of the Rule
of Law in this culture, including the legal culture. On the one hand, the
Rule of Law is invoked as a guaranty against tyranny On the other hand,
it is invoked to require unquestioning obedience to law, no matter what its
content. Both of these claims emphasize process although, under some
views, the Rule of Law embodies the substantive values of rights, liberties
and liberal democracy Another tension identified by Margaret Radin exists
in legal scholarship between what she terms "instrumental" views and
112. See Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MicH. L. REv. 1971 (1990); Michelman, Bringing the Law
to Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 74 CoR ELL L. Rv. 256 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman,
A Plea]; West, Constitutionalism, supra note 3.
113. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8; Michelman, A Plea, supra note 112.
114. See Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 309-15 (1989); West, Constitution-
alism, supra note 3. See generally Michelman, A Plea, supra note 112; Schlag, Images of the
Political: The Normative and the Epistemic (paper presented at the Dec. 9, 1989 Conference
on Constitutional Law and Theory in a Conservative Era) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the Indiana Law Journal).
115. See Marshall, Commentary: Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARv L. REv 1 (1987).
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"substantive" views of the Rule of Law. This tension reflects the paradox
as well: "The instrumental conception [of the Rule of Law] is a model of
government by rules to achieve the government's ends, whatever they may
be. The substantive conception is a model of government by rules to achieve
the goals of the social contract: liberty and justice." 6
For many legal scholars, as well as political actors, the privileged under-
standing of the Rule of Law and its virtues '" endows it with the substantive
characteristic of preventing tyranny and oppression."' As E.P Thompson
wrote in his historical study of the oppressive Black Act in England, the
development of the Rule of Law is usually seen as an "unqualified human
good."" 9 Familiar to most are the favorable views of the Rule of Law
captured by Thomas Paine's declaration that in America, "'the Rule of
Law is King.1'20 and the statement that the government of the United States
is a government of laws, not men [sic].' 2' Although historical development
of the idea that law binds the politically powerful and the governors as well
as the governed was an unquestionable improvement over the abuses of
whimsical and arbitrary tyrants, this fact alone does not ensure that the
Rule of Law is the Rule of good Law, as Joseph Raz has written.'2 Even
the prime virtue of the Rule of Law, that all are bound by it, does not
dictate the content of the law.
116. Radin, Reconsiderng the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. Ruv 781, 792 (1989).
117. I want to stress that by observing that our confidence in the ability of the Rule of
Law to protect us from authoritarianism is rmsplaced does not entail any claim that the Rule
of Law virtues do not, have real value or are insignificant. The Rule of Law virtues are
important, but they alone do not invariably protect against oppression. In criticizing aspects
of legality's ethic of rule- (or standard-) following, I am not claiming that all rules are bad
or that rule adherence is necessarily bad. I am asserting that it is mistaken to assume that the
Rule of Law is an absolute safeguard against abuses of power and authoritarian oppression.
Similarly, good rules should be implemented and followed, but just because something is a
rule does not automatically mean that it is good or right; and even rules seen as good may
have oppressive or dehumamazing effects that we should not and cannot ignore. I argue this
point in the context of a rule requiring no distinction on the basis of race and in the context
of the first amendment's prohibition on regulation of speech. See Henderson, Whose Nature?,
supra note 25.
118. See, Sen. George Mitchell's statements during Oliver North's testimony in the Iran-
Contra hearings: "The rule of law is critical in our society. It's the great equalizer, because
in America everybody is equal before the law. However important and noble an objective,
and surely democracy abroad is important and is noble, it cannot be achieved at the expense
of the rule of law in our country." W COHEN & G. Mrrcisau, MEN OF ZEAL 170 (1988).
"We have to respect the rule of law until we can change the law itself, because otherwise ,the
rule of law will be reduced to the law of rule." Id. at 182. I must admit, I stood up and
cheered when Sen. Mitchell spoke those words.
119. E. THoMPsoN, Winos AND HuNmas 266 (1975). But see Horwitz, The Rule of Law:
An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977) (a critique similar to the one
here).
120. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Sr. L. REv 1, 18 (1984) (quoting T. PAINE,
CooON SENSE AND OTHER PoLIcCAL WRrnius 32 (N. Adkins ed. 1953)).
121. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at 1499-1500.
122. J. RAz, AumaoRr, supra note 13, at 211, 227.
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There is nothing intrinsic to the Rule of Law that entails absolute or even
partial protection of individuals or groups from tyranny and oppression,
despite our habitual use of the Rule of Law in this sense.123 It is perfectly
consistent to have an authoritarian state under the Rule of Law, for although
the Rule of Law establishes that "government shall be ruled by the law
and subject to it," the form of government under law may be a dictator,
an oligarchy or a democracy. 24 For example, South Africa is an authori-
tarian state operating under Rule of Law principles, but it cannot be termed
a free society even though it is a democracy for the white mnority and has
a written constitution.125 Similarly, the government of the United States has
tyrannized whole populations, including African-Americans, Native Amen-
cans and Japanese Americans, under the Rule of Law.
Further, the Rule of Law has another authoritarian aspect: the Rule of
Law requires obedience to authorities constituted by law and signifies the
state's power of social control. Although Spiro Agnew and Edwin Meese
might be caricatures of this meaning, their (at times exaggerated) "law and
order" rhetoric hardly diminishes its force, even among legal scholars. As
Joseph Vining has asserted, law depends on obedience: "Any theory [of
law], indeed any conception of system in human affairs, contains an unstated
and usually unexamined assumption that people will follow the law. If
people don't follow the law, they could be required to."'' 2 And as Robert
Cover so eloquently reminded us, the agents and institutions of the law
have the power to compel obedience by force if it is not forthconing and
to punish disobedience.1 27 Finally, as Margaret Radin has noted, the Rule
of Law assumes that "rules are supposed to rule" 2 no matter what their
moral content. Thus, the Rule of Law may be malicious or benign, and
laws and rules may be harsh and punitive or humanitarian.
For one dedicated to law, it is difficult, to appreciate that law often
facilitates the abuse of power and is both directly and indirectly implicated
in human suffering: the Hart-Fuller debate about whether Nazi Germany
123. Id. at 210, 220-21.
124. Id. at 212.
125. See, e.g., Kentridge, The Pathology of a Legal System: Criminal Justice in South
Africa, 128 U. PA. L. REv 603, 604-06 (1980); Potts, Criminal Liability, Public Policy, and
the Principle of Legality in the Republic of South Africa, 73 J. Crim. L. & CmmiNoLooY 1061
(1982).
126. J. VINING, supra note 14, at 156.
127 Cover, Violence, supra note 12; see also Luban, supra note 8, at 2176-86 (discussing
the authoritarian nature of the Supreme Court's decision in Walker v. City of Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307 (1967)); Forbath, supra note 11 (resort to use of federal and state force to
enforce injunctions against the labor movement); Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse,
and the Legal System: Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U.L. REv 491, 491-94 (1989) (discussing
the jailing of a mother for contempt of court when she refused to disclose the whereabouts
of her child in order to prevent court-ordered visitation rights of the child's father).
128. Radin, supra note 116, at 809 (emphasis in original).
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did or did not have law-a debate that has continued in various forms'29-
might reflect the legal scholar's wish to deny law's complicity with evil.'30
Hart had argued that the natural law argument that law must meet the
"nummum requirements of morality"' 3' or not be law at all was mistaken:
to conflate what is and what ought to be "will serve ... only to conceal
the facts."'3 2 The problem of Nazi Germany was not that law was invalid
as "contravening the fundamental principles of morality," but that for
some reason, the separation of law and morals "acquired a smister character
in Germany."' 33 Fuller responded that law must have an inner morality to
be law at all, claiming that Nazi Germany's laws violated that inner morality
by violating the Rule of Law virtues of nonretroactivity, publicity and
disregard of the duly promulgated legal texts that were in place, and that
therefore Germany had no law during the Nazi regime. 34 In defense of the
Rule of Law's virtue, Fuller wrote:
To me there is nothing shocking in saying that a dictatorship which
clothes itself with a tinsel of legal form can so far depart from the
morality of order, from the inner morality of law itself, that it ceases
to be a legal system. When a system calling itself law is predicated upon
a general disregard by judges of the terms of the laws they purport to
enforce, when this system habitually cures its legal irregularities, even
the grossest, by retroactive statutes, when it has only to resort to forays
of terror in the streets, which no one dares challenge, in order to escape
even those scant restraints imposed by the pretence of legality . . it is
not hard for me, at least, to deny to it the name of law '31
Ffiller was correct in stating that Rule of Law virtues do exclude some
methods of using law to realize authoritarian goals: requiring that govern-
ment and its officials be bound by the law, requiring that laws be applied
equally and foridding the use of secret or retroactive laws can diminish
abuse. 36 Yet, because Rule of Law virtues are not inconsistent with evil
law, these procedural goods under the Rule of Law are a necessary but
129. See R. DwoKIN, LAw's EMnnR 101-08 (1986) (denying issue has any relevance); Finnis,
On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire, 6 LAw & PHIL. 357, 368-70 (1987). Richard
Posner makes a similar point in his recent book. R. PosNER, T PROBLMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
229-39 (1990) [hereinafter R. PostNER, JUIsPRUDENcE].
130. Thus, Ronald Dworkin never satisfactorily answered how Judge Siegfried should decide
a case in Nazi Germany involving the lack of contract nghts for Jewish people under the
interpretive theory developed in Law's Empire. See R. DwoRmiN, supra note 129, at 104-08.
131. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HLv. L. REv. 593, 618
(1958).
132. Id. at 629.
133. Id. at 618.
134. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAv. L. Rnv.
630, 650-56 (1958).
135. Id. at 660.
136. See J. Faruis, supra note 44, at 273-74.
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insufficient safeguard against authoritarian regimes.137 Authoritarianism is
not arbitrariness, whim, or caprice-it is unremitting insistence on obedience
and punishment of those who disobey Thus law, like all forms of normative
authority, can easily carry within it the seeds of oppression, intolerance and
demands for blind obedience without necessarily violating Rule of Law
precepts. Unless one stretches the meaning of the Rule of Law to include
the substantive requirements of reciprocity, fairness, and respect for persons
on the part of the state, 38 there is little to prevent authoritarian abuses
under law The Rule of Law may therefore offer little more than symbolic
comfort to those concerned with the use of law to oppress and pumsh
human beings.
Joseph Vimng is a legal scholar who has been concerned with the
relationship of law to authoritarianism. But he has concerned himself
primarily with defending common law legal method and practice, as well
as the internal morality of law, against what he sees as the growth in the
law of bureaucratic formalism and diffusion of responsibility. His book
entitled The Authoritative and the Authoritarian139 manifests a general
tendency on the part of legal thinkers to use the terms authoritarian or
authoritariamsm as a contrast to what law properly is. Thus, Vimng
variously refers to authoritarianism as blind obedience, the tyranny of
personal authority, and simple obedience. 40 According to Vimng, authon-
tananism is the state of affairs that occurs when the Rule of Law is ignored:
he uses it to mean governments run by charismatic, man-on-a-white-horse
leaders, regimes of pure power and tyranny, 4' or government by impersonal
bureaucracy 142 For Vimng, authoritariamsm signifies, as one reviewer noted,
"a world of madness, solitude, detachment, resistance, disillusionment,
distrust, overlooking, mockery, indifference, strategy, process, bondage,
death, passivity, pain, nature, doubt, enmity, meaninglessness, and power."' 43
This description of horrors that can arise in authoritarian regimes is not
authoritarianism.
Further, Vimng backs away from some of the implications of authontar-
iamsm for law and legality; he seems to be ambivalent about relinquishing
obedience and formal authoritariamsm. The authoritative is still that which
137 This is true despite Lon Fuller's confidence that perfection of the Rule of Law virtues,
or the internal morality of law, would converge with the good. See L. FuiL.R, Ta MoiisrrA
OF LAw 153-86 (1977).
138. Id. at 786, 791. Radin refers to these notions as those that are embodied in the
"substantive" version of the Rule of Law, which combines the procedural requirements of
the "instrumentalist" conception with the achievement of the "goals of the social contract:
liberty and justice." Radin, supra note 116, at 792.
139. J. Vun, n, supra note 14.
140. See, e.g., id. at 124, 157, 166.
141. Id. at 157.
142. Id.
143. Miller, The Glittering Eye of Law, 84 MiCH. L. Rav 880, 881-82 (1986).
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commands obedience;"44 perhaps it is his insistence on obedience to proper
legal authority that leads him to observe that "there is much of the
authoritarian woven into law" and that "a little authoritarianism is a good
thing.' ' 45 To the extent that it is not a good thing, Vining appears to
assume that the internal methods of legal practice and thought within the
common law method will prevent authoritarianism in law.
In contrast to Fuller and Vining, two legal scholars, Robert Cover and
Robin West, have made substantial contributions to understanding legal
authoritarianism. These two scholars have explored aspects of legal author-
itanamsm in the greatest depth and consistency across their work, and
although each explore only one side of the authoritarian coin, they both
have explored the relation of law to oppression and abuse. The work of
Robert Cover is concerned with the punitive, oppressive and violent aspects
of law; the work of Robin West addresses the problem of uncritical
obedience to law and legal authority.
The lack of scholarly acknowledgment, until very recently, of Cover's
suggestion that law has too often been a mechanism for state violence and
human oppression indicates the difficulty legal scholars have in acknowl-
edging that law can be oppressive as a matter of course, rather than as an
occasional exception.146 Perhaps no other scholar has been more concerned
with the violent and punitive nature of law than Cover. His journey began
with his study of judicial enforcement of the fugitive slave laws in Justice
Accused' 47 and ended in an assertion that law was not an instrument of the
state. He wrote that he was an "anarchist . with anarchy understood to
mean the absence of rulers, not the absense of law.' 14 By this statement,
Cover may have meant to reiterate Paine's statement that it is the Rule of
Law that is king, but it seems to have rested more on Cover's belief that
law is a site of struggle over meaning. 149 For Cover, law was not state
power or even an instrument of government, but rather is any social
understanding of normative authority:5 0 "[Tihere is a radical dichotomy
between the social organization of law as power and the organization of
144. See J. VIurNO, supra note 14, at 123, 185.
145. Id. at 148.
146. A striking example can be found in the contributions to the Yale Law Journal issue
published in memory of Cover. See Essays, 96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987). But see Forbath, supra
note 11 (examming court-sanctioned violence in "private" sector against the labor movement
prior to the Wagner Act); Luban, supra note 8 (discussing the authoritarian action by Supreme
Court in Walker v. City of Birmingham); Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV 1105, 1223-24 (1989) ("Law
is two parts violence and three parts hope.").
147. "R. COVER, JUS1CE AccusED (1975).
148. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV' 179, 181
(1985) [hereinafter Cover, Folktales].
149. Id. at 181; Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 26, at 9-10.
150. Cover, Folktales, supra note 148, at 182.
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law as meaning."'' Further, "in the domain of legal meaning, it is force
and violence that are problematic."'' 2 Law was the normative and interpre-
tive commitment of a community; it was meaning accompamed by such
strong commitment that it could lead to active resistance to other interpre-
tations. While pure legal meaning was, for Cover, divorced from power
and coercion, judicial violence had to be tested against community com-
mitments. 5 3 Because, for Cover, "[a] legal world is built only to the extent
that there are commitments that place bodies on the line,"' 5 4 violence might
be the only way to assure the domnance of one legal interpretation over
another. One need not accept that law is whatever someone is prepared to
put her body on the line for to gain an appreciation of Cover's exposure
of the punitive and oppressive aspects of the Amencan constitutional system
or the authoritarian nature of the judiciary and the state.
Cover argued that the state sought to control law, its means of social
control, in part through its "imperfect monopoly over the domain of
violence.' 55 He asserted that judges invoke and implement state violence
by insisting on obedience to their orders and sacrificing "legal meaning to
the interest in public order."' 5 6 Judges, according to Cover, most typically
applied a "statist" approach to law, denying the efficacy of alternative
community interpretations. 57 But legal meanings developed by committed
communities were law as much as the meanings developed by the courts.
He noted, "the jurisgenerative principle by which legal meaning proliferates
. never exists in isolation from violence. Interpretation always takes place
in the shadow of coercion. Courts, at least the courts of the.state, are
characteristically 'junspathic," '5 8 literally killing off alternative legal mean-
ings. 59
Cover also described a kind of "process authoritarianism" by describing
the junsdictional reasons given by judges to "place the violence of admin-
istration beyond the reach of 'law." ' " 60 He argued that judges promoted
substantive authoritarianism through procedure, both by asserting their own
power to punish and by deferring to state violence. Judges, by using
"jurisdictional excuses to avoid disrupting the orderly deployment of state
power and privilege," reinforced authoritarianism.1 6' In his examination of
151. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 26, at 18.
152. Id. at 25.
153. Cover, Folktales, supra note 148, at 191.
154. Cover, Violence, supra note 12, at 1605.
155. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 26, at 52.
156. Id. at 55.
157. Id. at 54-58, 67
158. Id. at 40.
159. Id. at 40, 53.
160. Id. at 56.
161. Id. at 67
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Supreme Court cases, Cover argued that the Court had adopted what was
in fact a substantively authoritarian stance towards its equity jurisdiction in
injunction cases, "equity [being] 'strong' when the court is aligned with
state violence and 'weak' when the court is a counterweight to that vio-
lence.' ' 62 Private resistance-resistance to state law by citizens-was sub-
ordinated to a "regime of obedience-of state superiority" and "public
order."'' 6 Thus the Supreme Court's approval of the punitive use of state
violence by a court in Walker v. City of Birmingham,164 which held that
citizens had the duty to obey even unconstitutional lower court injunctions,
was, for Cover, pure authoritarianism.
The rule of [Walker] subordinates the creation of legal meamng to the
interest in public order. It is the rule of the judge, the insider, looking
out. It speaks to the judge as agent of state violence and employer of
that violence against the "private" disorder of movements, communities,
umons, parties, "people," "mobs." Even when wrong, the judge
is to act and is entitled to be obeyed. The signal Walker sends the judge
is to be aggressive in confronting private resistance, because his authority
will be vindicated . .
Thus, the Justices were both morally irresponsible and implicated in state
violence and statist law.'66 When asked to enjoin the state from engaging
in violence, as in, for example, the Los Angeles police chokehold case,167
the Court used "jurisdictional excuses to avoid disrupting the orderly
deployment of state power and privilege."'168 Using the reasons of federalism,
separation of powers, deference to "majoritarian branches" and, in the
case of lower court judges, obedience to hierarchy, Cover argued that the
Court's jurisdictional principles "align the interpretive acts of judges with
the acts and interests of those who control the means of violence."' 69
In Violence and the Word, 70 Cover opposed the interpretivist turn in
legal scholarship, pointing out that "[l]egal interpretive acts signal and
occasion the imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her
understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his
property, his children, even his life.'' Legal interpretation, unlike literary
interpretation, was political and was "either played out on the field of pain
and death or it is something less (or more) than law."' 172 Legal interpretation,
162. Id. at 56.
163. Id. at 55.
164. 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967).
165. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 26, at 55; see Luban, supra note 8, at 2176-
86.
166. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 26, at 58.
167. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
168. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 26, at 58.
169. Id. at 57.
170. Cover, Violence, supra note 12.
171. Id. at 1601.
172. Id. at 1606-07.
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as judges engaged in it, was "(1) a practical activity, (2) designed to generate
credible threats and actual deeds of violence, (3) in an effective way."'' 7
For example, the ideology of punishment justified to the judge and to
others the violence of the criminal law '74 Drawing on Milgram's study of
obedience to authority, 7 5 Cover argued that institutional roles facilitated
the imposition of violence. 7 6 Although Cover did not make the argument,
his description of judges bears some resemblance to that of role authon-
tarians. Consistent with Milgram's observations, Cover argued that when
judges interpret the law they shelter themselves from the violent implications
of their role as interpreters and they set into motion violence within
institutional roles, giving persons permission to inflict pain that insulates
them from inhibition. 7 7 Judges thus identify with and are active in perpet-
uating state violence; that violence in turn limits the possibility of finding
common meaning and "law "1178
While Cover emphasized the punitive and violent nature of law to
demonstrate that judicial practices embody substantive authoritarianism,
Robin West has focused more on unquestioning submission to authority
and legal imperatives in much of her work. Although West generally has
used the term authoritarian in a formal sense of unquestioning obedience
to rules in the belief that the authority is good, a use similar to that of
Arendt, 79 she has not ignored the potential for oppression in the submission
to authority Her criticism of law and econoncs and of liberal legal theory
discusses obedience to authority, but her work criticizing the law and
literature movement tends, like Cover's criticism, to focus more on law's
potential for violence and oppression. West has argued that all three of
these schools of thought have tended to celebrate legal authority and
obedience to law without acknowledging the oppression, subjugation and
domination such celebrations of law entail.
Submission to power, blind obedience to authority and the resulting
immoral consequences of abdicating moral responsibility are concerns
throughout West's writing. She has argued that the authoritarian element
of law and economics scholarship is captured in its use of consent as a
proxy for the good. Thus, her critique of Posner's normative law and
economics theory effectively used Kafka's narratives of relationships to
authority and to law to demonstrate that consensual transactions fail to
serve as meaningful proxies either for autonomy or for an individual's well-
173. Id. at 1610.
174. Id. at 1608.
175. S. MmoaM, supra note 71.
176. Cover, Violence, supra note 12, at 1615.
177. Id. at 1614-15.
178. Id. at 1628-29.
179. Conversation with Robin West (Nov. 25, 1988).
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being.1Iw Using excerpts from Kafka's stories to provide illustrations of
consensual transactions, West argued from a psychodynamic approach that
people consent to transactions that not only make them less well off, but
also make them objectively nmserable. People consent to a number of things
that are objectively harmful to them in order to please hierarchical authority
(the whipping scene in Kafka's novel The Trial),8' because at some level
they crave pumshment and expiation of guilt, 82 or because they have agreed
to and acquiesced in the authority's imperatives. 183
West posits throughout the article that obedience to authority is something
people might crave "because it feels good to be ruled and to be demed"' 84
or that obedience is an instinctually "ingrained need."' 85 One need not
accept her tentative psychodynanuc explanations for obedience that does
not, at the moment of obeying, originate in fear of authority. Perhaps
another of her suggested reasons for obedience is better supported by her
arguments: consensual submission to authority becomes a functional way
to abdicate moral responsibility and choice. Certainly in a post-modern era
when "everything is up for grabs,"' 186 deference to authority in order to
avoid anxiety and groundlessness, seems to fit both with Kafka's literature
and with some of our current legal practice. 87 Submission seldom comes
from fear-at least not directly"'-but may be the most functional way to
avoid moral choice and responsibility for that choice:
Obedience to legal rules to which we would have consented relieves us
of the task of evaluating the morality and prudence of our own actions,
a task that would be time-consuming and perhaps beyond our powers.
If we want to lead moral lives, both for the sake of virtue and for the
sake of others, the best way to do so may be simply to obey Our
tendency to legitimate lawful authority may have good or evil
consequences, depending upon the moral value of the legal system to
which we have submitted and the moral quality of the relationship
between state and citizen that our consent nurtures.8 9
Picking up on the theme of abdication of moral responsibility in a piece
on authoritarian constitutional interpretation, West has argued that we have
180. West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HAv. L. Rlv 384 (1985) [hereinafter
West, Authority].
181. Id. at 395-96.
182. Id. at 416, 421-22.
183. Id. at 416-17.
184. Id. at 420 (discussing The Refusal).
185. Id. at 423.
186. Tis phrase was introduced into the scholarly lexicon by Arthur Leff. Leff, Unspeakable
Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DurE L.J. 1229, 1249.
187. West, Authority, supra note 180, at 420.
188. Id. at 423; see also I. YALoM, ExmNrErTi PsYcHoT-ERaAPY 261 (1980) (individuals will
embrace authority to avoid responsibility).
189. West, Authority, supra note 180, at 424 (footnote omitted).
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delegated our moral choices to courts, which in turn defer to the authority
of the constitutional text and obey the text rather than confront the moral
dimension of the problem.'" An authoritarian judge answers constitutional
law questions by reference to the authoritative text and obedience to that
text or its framers. We submit ourselves to the text or delegate moral choice
to such judges "because we have abandoned the project of our own moral
self-governance."'' We mistake the authority of law for the good: legal
authority becomes the equivalent of the moral good, and the question we
ask becomes "what does the legally authoritative text tell us to do?" West
argues that in the process, the question of the good or evil of a constitutional
practice, rule or provision is lost. By asserting that the authoritarian
orientation is "amoral' '1 92 or "agnostic"' 93 as to value, West has overlooked
the fact that the authoritative text may be perceived as containing the
morally good command, however. Indeed, the authoritarian may have a
strong moral attachment to the authority of the text and its rightness or
goodness. 94
In a piece on what she terms liberal legal theory, West explores the belief
that the Rule of Law, as embodied in the Constitution, is moral. 9 She
argues that liberal legalism posits obedience to the totems of the Rule of
Law and the Constitution as necessary brakes on human aggression. For
liberal legal scholars as diverse as Laurence Tribe and Charles Fried, then,
the only solution to state power is obedience to true law; true law is the
moral solution to human aggression and therefore deserves unquestiomng
acceptance and obedience. 96 Thus, for "American legal liberalism the
only moral solution to the problem of power is obedience to law . ITihe
law that does and should command our obedience is both autonomous from
the political process and rich in moral content."' 97 True law is a rich blend
of rights and principles that protects individuals from state power and the
evil desires of others. Judges, accordingly, must be obedient to the disem-
bodied law- "Judges can obey the command of the totem because morally
they must obey," for otherwise "the community [would] face the unrestrained,
190. West, Authoritarian Impulse, supra note 8; see also Sandel, Moral Argument and
Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAias. L. Rav. 521 (1989) (similar point
about bracketing of moral discourse in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), but does not reach conclusion that authoritarian).
191. West, Authoritarian Impulse, supra note 8, at 538; cf. Michelman, Law's Republic,
supra note 8, at 1502-15 (describing republican tradition of self-governance versus pluralism).
192. West, Authoritarian Impulse, supra note 8, at 539.
193. Id. at 541.
194. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
195. West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory
of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. Rav 817 (1986).
196. Id. at 838-40.
197 Id. at 838.
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liberated power of individuals, which is something to fear, not something
to celebrate. ' ' 19s
Like Cover, West observes that the interpretivist turn celebrates literary
methods, interpretive communities and internal examination of legal texts
at-the expense of recognizing that law, unlike literature, inflicts violence
and pain on real people.199 Rather than being merely the use of reason to
interpret a pre-existing legal text, "adjudication, including constitutional
adjudication, is the creation of law backed by force . . Adjudication is
an act of power, not of cognition." ° Objectivists such as Stanley Fish and
Ronald Dworkin, who argue that disciplimng rules of interpretation or the
community's moral codes supplement the legal text, make a mistake similar
to that of conservative natural law theorists. Both create the condition that
the law that is becomes the law that ought to be, possibly creating the
conditions for authoritarianism.?' West uses the novel Pudd'nhead Wilson
to illustrate why objective interpretation-obedience to an objective, au-
thoritative legal text-does not lead to moral results. That is, use of the
community's conventional morality, as embodied in legal texts, as a reference
in interpreting those texts can lead to oppressive results. 20 2 West uses The
Floating Opera to argue that subjective interpretation-the denial that there
is any real basis for moral criticism of law or of adjudication-creates the
nihilism of power and no way in which to combat it.203
West also criticizes some of the law and literature work of James Boyd
White by emphasizing the repressive or punitive result of reducing com-
munities and law to text. If texts are central "to the form and substance
of a community's moral and social life," and "[w]e ought to think and
read legal texts, not as political or positive commands, but as texts which
both constitute and constrain the community's moral commitments, '1 204 we
lose the ability to criticize legal or "shared constitutive texts" independent
of the texts themselves. The shared text, by nature, leads to exclusion and
dehumanization of those not included in the textual community as readers,
writers or critics. 2 5 The discourse of power excludes those it injures, or
makes it impossible to communicate that injury to the members of the
relevant textual community. If this is so, then constitutive texts can both
198. Id. at 877.
199. West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-
Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. Rav 203 (1987) [hereinafter West, Adjudication].
200. Id. at 205.
201. "Historically, the consequence of the blending of the law and the moral basis from
which we criticize law has almost always been a politically regressive insistence upon the
morality of existing power Id. at 208-09.
202. Id. at 219-44.
203. Id. at 258-76.
204. West, Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature Movement,
I YALE J. L. & HulmANmas 129, 131 (1988).
205. Id. at 140-41.
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justify oppression of those who are different and blind members of the
community to that oppression. And because the punitive, repressive side of
authoritariamsm flourishes in an atmosphere of objectification of persons
and prejudice, it would seem that the argument from constitutive texts also
creates a ground for authoritarianism.
From the work of Cover and West, together with the scholarly work on
authoritarianism generally, it is possible to devise a tentative description of
the substantively authoritarian problem in law. Descriptively, the authon-
taran orientation to law stresses obedience to positive law and rules and
takes a punitive or moralistic stance against deviance. It is suspicious both
of human nature and of the power of legal actors. The authoritarian
emphasizes the need for positive law as a guarantor of predictability, stability
and order, regardless of the oppressive consequences. This orientation fears
change and frequently insists that law is grounded in traditions and the
past-oppressive uses of law are justified because the possibility of alter-
natives is frightemng. 2°6 The intolerance of ambiguity that characterizes
authoritarians is part of this orientation to law This is not a jurisprudence
of formal authoritarianism, that is, of deferential or even blind obedience
to accepted traditional authority alone. Instead, it is a jurisprudence of
dormnance and punishment towards those who are different or deviant.
II. AUTHORITARIAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND DECISIONMAXING
This section discusses legal scholarship about judging and law that creates
the conditions for formal authoritarianism, which in turn facilitates sub-
stantively authoritarian legal and judicial practices. It then examines some
recent Supreme Court decisions that appear to demonstrate the linkage of
these ways of thinking about law and judging to substantive authoritan-
amsm. While this section makes no claim that there is a direct, causal
connection between the work discussed and the Court's jurisprudence, a
claim that would be impossible to prove, this section does emphasize the
striking similarities in the reasoning and justifications used by both groups.
Nowhere is an authoritarian orientation more striking than in the theories
about proper judicial decisionmaking currently propounded by many scho-
lars and in the actual practice of these theories and arguments by the current
Supreme Court. The scholarly approaches to constitutional law and judicial
decisionmaking that are authoritarian reflect preoccupations with judicial
power, the legitimacy of judicial review and the status of the federal judiciary
as unelected and unaccountable to the people. These arguments are hardly
original or new; however, this scholarship also projects onto judges partic-
ular negative traits, and when its other concerns are examined, appears to
206. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Govern-
ment, 100 HAgv L. REv 4, 24-33 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces].
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be distinguishable from other American constitutional scholarship. This
scholarship emphasizes law as a mechanism of social control through its
privileging of predictability, stability and control. There is a portrayal of
the judiciary as tyrannical and powerful, unresponsive and always willing
to thwart "the people's" will. Another earmark of this scholarship is its
emphasis on obedience to positive law narrowly conceived: there is usually
one law or legal authority, one formative intent or text to be obeyed, rather
than alternative sources of law, authority and meaning.
The arguments of authoritarian jurisprudence do not break neatly into
categories, although they can be separated to some extent. The model of
authoritarian jurisprudence as applied to judges proceeds in several dimen-
sions, or perhaps follows a continuum of time from the decisionmaking
process to the enforcement of the decision. Authoritarian process arguments
oppose judicial discretion of any type and insist on judicial obedience to
rules and power. These arguments deny that the judge should ever reach
an independent moral judgment. More significant to the issue of authon-
tananism is the steadfast refusal of those making obedience arguments to
acknowledge that judges frequently can refer to and choose among multiple
legal authorities or doctrines rather than having only one narrowly defined
positive law rule to obey. Arguments for authoritarian results emphasize
the notion that law is an instrument of power and control, and appear to
be grounded in. a bleak and distrustful vision of human nature.
A weak, formal legal authoritarianism may be endemic to legality, but
authoritarianism in a substantive sense not only emphasizes obedience to
law but also manifests distrust of judges, insistence on an absolute severance
between concern for positive law and justice, and a singular lack of concern
with the continuing oppression of individuals. In examining the authoritarian
dynamic and effects of representative scholars, this section uses the work
of particular authors and their articles as illustrations. 20 7 This section focuses
on the particular visions of law and judging portrayed in the writings and
demonstrates how these writings manifest an endorsement of what is,
ultimately, substantively authoritarian judging. This section first examines
formally authoritarian arguments and their link to substantive authoritari-
amsm. It then examines more explicit substantively authoritarian arguments.
A. Formally Authoritarian Legal Scholarship
The works of Raoul Berger and Robert Bork have often been criticized
for their constitutional fundamentalism, their insistence on adherence to the
207. While the arguments of these scholars are not great departures from the norms of legal
scholarship, they are distinguishable from the work of other legal scholars who have been
labelled authoritanan by commentators. See, e.g., West, Adjudication, supra note 199, at 210-
19 (Robin West's characterization of Owen Fiss' invocation of an interpretive community as
authoritarian); Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at 1519-24 (Frank Michelman's
characterization of Bruce Ackerman's work as authoritarian).
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original intent of the framers, and their similar insistence on obedience to
the words and text of the Constitution. 20 8 Although their scholarship is
undoubtedly the best known and most influential, there has been a bur-
geoning number of articles making similar claims since the end of the 1970s.
Richard Kay, for example, is another representative of this line of
scholarship, and his arguments, while extreme, reveal its dynamic. Against
scholarly objections to the rigidity and antiquity of originalism, Kay posits
affirmation of "the values inherent in 'inflexibility'-the values of stability
and clarity ",209 The moral content of the authoritative command and the
moral nature of the authority are of less concern than preservation of the
authority itself. Because the Constitution and the framers provided "an
answer to the validity of every new thing" and omitted nothing, 210 the
federal government and the judiciary cannot legitimately do more than the
Constitution, so defined, permits. The source of all state authority is the
Constitution and the framers, and anything the government does that is not
"traceable to the enumerated institutions and powers is an exercise of power
contrary to the Constitution. " 21  The framers meant to bind future
generations,2 12 and the framers' fear of judicial independence and power
means that they intended that judges not have "any role as formulators of
some values apart from positive law ,,213 Obedience to positive law is more
important than concern with justice or with freedom from law that op-
presses. In a statement that reveals how closely linked formally and sub-
stantively authoritarian thinking are, Kay argues that "stability and assurance
may be more important than the actual content of the substantive rules
applied.1 214 And'predictability, control and certainty justify demanding that
judges obey the positive law of the formative moment, in spite of the
goodness or badness of those laws. 2 .5 It is ironic that Kay has argued that
judicial deviation from the original intent of the framers would threaten us
with totalitarianism, 216 given that much of the perceived deviation from
originalism in the Warren and Burger eras limited government and private
power.
Kay's argument is not particularly subtle. The most subtle of the formally
authoritarian constitutional scholars may be Henry Monaghan, who has
208. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at 1496 n.11; Posner, Bork and
Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV 1365 (1990).
209. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 Nw U.L. REv 226, 289 (1988).
210. Id. at 257 This is a truly God-like vision of the constitutional moment.
211. Id. at 256.
212. Id. at 281.
213. Id. at 283.
214. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 291-92.
216. Id. at 290.
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shifted ground over time from insisting on onginalism, to insisting on
obedience, to arguing that, while courts may have to obey precedents that
deviate from the original intent, such deviant precedent should never be the
ground for future decisions. Rather, future decisions should refer to the
original intent or plain textual meaning whenever possible. 217 Monaghan's
apparent objective has been to discredit, under the guise of formal author-
itananism, any liberal/progressive arguments for constitutional interpreta-
tion directed at ending oppression, ensuring substantive equality or developing
constitutional rights for the historically disempowered. For example, Mon-
aghan explicitly attacks as "perfectionist, ' 21 8 and hopelessly at odds- with
the original intent, the constitutional visions of a number of liberal/
progressive constitutional scholars, including Paul Brest, Ronald Dworkin,
Kenneth Karst, Frank Michelman, Michael Perry, and Laurence Tribe. 219
According to Monaghan, such advocates of judicial activism would allow
nullification of the political process by illegitimate means, that is, the use
of substantive judicial review.221
Monaghan, relying heavily on the works of John Hart Ely and Raoul
Berger, argues that the sole source of legitimacy for judicial review of the
outcomes of the political processes-in other words, much of law-is judicial
inquiry "into the openness and fairness of the political processes."M Ac-
cording to Monaghan, because the other branches of government are the
ones with the "authority to make law," raising "legitimacy questions for
judicial lawmaking," 22 the Court has no authority to "make" law "when
the political organs have spoken." 224 While the Court could interpret statutes
with reference to visions of political morality, Monaghan argues that the
Constitution prohibits the use of such "indeterminate" criteria as "a strong
217. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 CoLuM. L. R-v. 723,
772-73 (1988) [hereinafter Monaghan, Stare Decisis]. Monaghan argues that any doctrinal
inconsistency between Bowers v. Hardwick and Roe v. Wade can be explained in terms of
original understanding: "Accordingly, even if Roe's rule is preserved, the question whether its
reasoning should be extended or is rightly halted in the name of the original understanding
presents a quite different issue." Id. at 759.
218. Perfectionists, according to Monaghan, consider the Constitution to be
perfect in one central respect: properly construed, the constitution guarantees
against the political order most equality and autonomy values which the com-
mentators think a twentieth century Western liberal democratic government ought
to guarantee to its citizens. [A] necessary link is asserted between the
constitution and currently "valid" notions of rights, equality and distributive
justice.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv 353, 358 (1981) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter Monaghan, Perfect].
219. Id. at 353-60.
220. Id. at 396.
221. Id. at 353-55.
222. Id. at 356.
223. Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
224. Id.
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set of judicially enforceable autonomy . claims" to invalidate legislation
or "to control the contrary determinations of the political process."5
Arguments for judicial reference to non-textual sources of nghts and prin-
ciples based on common law models of decisionmaking, in order to promote
humane values,2 6 fail to treat the Constitution as binding authority or as
a positive command. Rejecting what he terms a "common law" approach
to constitutional adjudication because it smuggles in "nontextually-grounded
principles of political morality,"' 27 Monaghan states that, because the Con-
stitution is the master rule of recognition, constitutional legal reasomng
should not concern itself with principles, justice, fairness, equality, or
political morality. The policy choices of the framers must not be overridden
by the Supreme Court. 8 For Monaghan, the "authoritative status" of the
written Constitution is the foundation for law. The Constitution should be
treated as a "super statute," a compact "whose contents could not be
altered by any organ of government."' 9 The framers' choices may only be
altered by the amendment process and never through adjudication.20 The
authoritative status of the Constitution "is a legitimate matter of debate
for political theorists interested in the nature of political obligation," but
the authoritative status of the Constitution's commands cannot be ques-
tioned or tampered with by legal actors.' 31 With regard to legal reasomng,
which by his definition is neither political nor moral reasomng, the text is
binding.232
Thus far, this summary of Monaghan's argument has focused on the
formally authoritarian component. On the one hand, the argument empha-
sizes obedience to revered, long-dead authorities and the founding moment,
in the ancient Roman authoritarian sense identified by Arendt.2 3 On the
other hand, judges must obey the commands of those branches of govern-
ment that the Constitution made sovereign and cannot take it upon them-
selves to make law Judges have no authority independent of positive law,
dictated by other sources. This is positivism with a vengeance: The "is"
and the "ought" are not, only separated by definition, but the ought as a
reference, interpretive device, or tool of critique and improvement would
disappear entirely from constitutional law
A substantively authoritarian spin manifests itself in Monaghan's partic-
ular examples of illegitimate Court decisions and illegitimate constitutional
theories. The equal protection clause stands only for the extension of "the
225. Id.
226. Id. at 391.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 374.
229. Id. at 392.
230. Id. at 376.
231. Id. at 383.
232. Id. at 84.
233. See supra notes 59-66, 69 and accompanying text.
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principle of political equality to blacks. ' '234 This political equality is a "thin"
one, having nothing to do with the liberal/progressive concern with access
to the political process and substantive equality or even the Warren Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 5 Indeed, under Monaghan's
theory, Brown is an illegitimate decision, because it was out of line with
the original intent of the drafters of the fourteenth amendment.2 6 Although
the Constitution permits, but does not require, the "political branches" to
enact laws expanding individual rights, substantive equality and autonomy,
courts are absolutely forbidden to do so.2 7 The ninth and fourteenth
amendment privileges and immunities clauses are meaningless, and therefore
do not permit judges to create nontextual rights of social equality, privacy
and autonomy under the Constitution. Even if the clauses were not super-
fluous, Monaghan argues that "a showing is necessary that this was not
.. to be a list [of rights] closed as of 1791 or 1868.'" 21 Not only are
courts prohibited from expanding rights, they also must obey laws prom-
ulgated by the other branches that restrict or abolish rights and liberties
that are not absolutely traceable to the Constitution. Monaghan's absolute
lack of concern with the contemporary goodness or rightness of the framers'
commands, or with principled ways judges could combat violence and
oppression in the name of law, forces judges to inflict the violence the
sovereign demands. In fact, the theory would require the reversal of a
number of progressive and liberatory Supreme Court decisions which com-
batted oppression and domination, including the incorporation of portions
of the Bill of Rights. 239
Monaghan has abandoned onginalism to some extent; history presented
him and other originalists with the reality of the radical deviation from the
original intent by the other branches of government. The tremendous growth
of and change in presidential and executive branch power cannot be rec-
onciled with the framers' intent. For example, the President has laid claim
over the years to plenary power over national security, 240 foreign relations
234. Monaghan, Perfect, supra note 218, at 364 (emphasis added).
235. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Monaghan, Perfect, supra note 218, at 372-73 (criticizing
Michelman's argument for providing means of effective political participation to those lustor-
ically and presently disenfranchised by protecting these groups from systematic bias).
236. Monaghan, Perfect, supra note 218, at 364-66, 373, 376; see also Monaghan, Stare
Decisis, supra note 217, at 728.
237. Monaghan, Perfect, supra note 218, at 396.
238. Id. at 367 (emphasis m original).
239. See Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 217, at 732, for an admission of this.
240. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1259-61 (1988); see also Kellman, Judicial Abduction
of Military Tort Accountability: But Who is to Guard the Guards Themselves?, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 1597.
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and war powers,24 and cabinet, administrative and judicial appointments.u2
When the Senate has challenged the presidential appointment power pursuant
to its constitutional obligation to approve certain presidential appointments,
as in the case of the nominations of John Tower and Robert Bork, it
encounters shocked criticism. 23' Congressional authority to investigate the
Iran-Contra affair was sharply called into question as an illegitimate chal-
lenge to presidential authority 2A4 The popularity of a president that gives
him the political strength to contravene the opimon of a majority on various
substantive issues, as was true in the Reagan years,24S does not legitimate
such plenary authority if one is making an argument of deference to majority
will as the ground for criticizing the Court. Yet Monaghan is sanguine
about the growth of the "Imperial Presidency."2A Continuing his attack on
judicial deviation from the command of the text and framers, Monaghan
simply assumes that presidential power is almost plenary, legitimate, and
so concentrated and effective that even the theoretically offsetting power of
Congress is "no longer descriptively accurate. ' 247 In fact, he once argued
against onginalism and plain textual meaning in interpreting presidential
power with regard to war powers,m indicating an authoritarian agenda
aimed specifically at courts. Rather than being troubled by the question of
the constitutional legitimacy of the growth in presidential power, Monaghan
appears to be concerned only to attack the legitimacy of an ostensible
increase in judicial power.
Monaghan's recent work continues to argue that judicial review is illegit-
imate and that the Court has repeatedly exceeded its authority 249 Using
Roe v. Wade ° as his stalking horse, he deplores judicial activism.2-
241. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv
1379 (1988); see Koh, supra note 240; Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The
Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972).
242. For an article referring to Bork's failed appointment as "a tragedy," and criticizing
the Senate for violating the President's "right" to make judicial appointments, see Ackerman,
Transformative Appointments, 101 HAgv L. Rnv 1164 (1988); see also Carter, The Confir-
mation Mess, 101 HARv L. REv 1185 (1988). See generally, Symposium: The Bork Nomi-
nation, 9 CAinozo L. REv. (1987).
243. See Ackerman, supra note 242.
244.'See W CohEN & G. MrrcHELL, supra note. 118, at 289-94.
245. Reagan's popularity remained extremely high although many took issue with his
substantive policies. See Roberts, Reagan's Final Rating is Best of Any President Since 40's,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
246. The term originated with Arthur Schlesinger's book of the same name. A. ScHLESINGER,
TE IMPERIAL PRESMENCY (1973).
247. Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 217, at 739.
248. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U.L. REv 19, 19-22 (1970).
249. See Monaghan, Stare Decists, supra note 217
250. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
251. The article is full of suggestions on how the Court might overrule Roe. See Monaghan,
Stare Decisis, supra note 217, at 746-48, 751, 754, 759; see also Monaghan, Perfect, supra
note 218, at 381.
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Monaghan argues for confining the Supreme Court within a "conservative"
scheme of law .2 2 Conceding that Brown should not be overruled even if it
violated original intent,21a he still wishes to "freeze" henceforth the Court's
constitutional decisionmaking powers. Some decisions, such as Brown and
the reapportionment cases, might not be reversible,254 because although they
violate original intent, the values of "consistency, coherence, fairness,
equality, predictability and efficiency" may require their retention.25 As to
decisions that he claims have gone beyond constitutional text or authority,
however, stare decisis can be justified "only to prevent disruption of
practices and expectations so settled, or to avoid the revitalization of a
public debate so divisive, that departure from the precedent would contribute
in some perceptible way to a failure of confidence in the lawfulness of
fundamental features of the political order.' 'z 6 He leaves unexplained how
the Court is to determine whether such conditions exist in a given case.
Monaghan simply asserts that stare decisis must "operate to keep issues off
the constitutional, if not the political agenda, thereby leaving open for
debate only less threatening issues." 25 This appears to contradict his ar-
gument that it is illegitimate for the Court to decide issues of public value
or general welfare, but it also suggests a substantively authoritarian vision.
As Robert Cover demonstrated, the manipulation of jurisdiction by courts-
a method of keeping issues off the constitutional agenda-has been used to
perpetuate government oppression. Arguing, as Monaghan does, that the
Court is required to keep decisive issues off its agenda would make it
impossible for the Court to consider cases involving oppression, because it
is by definition divisive and disruptive to tell oppressors that they can no
longer oppress.
Monaghan justifies authoritarian decisionmaking in yet another way, and
this justification appears to lead even more directly to substantively au-
thoritarian uses of law. The principle of stare decisis, for Monaghan,
embodies a Rule of Law virtue by requiring the Court to be bound by
252. Although Monaghan states m a footnote that he means "Burkean" conservatism,
Monaghan, Stare Dectsts, supra note 217, at 752 n.165, he never explains what he means by
that term. For an analysis of Burke and constitutional adjudication, see Wilson, supra note
5.
253. His argument in support of upholding Brown seems to be historically inaccurate; he
writes that the decision was "probably the Supreme Court's only legitimate response to the
nation's escalating moral and social turmoil." Monaghan, Stare Decists, supra note 217, at
772. But at the time Brown was argued and decided, there was no more turmoil than usual:
Brown itself triggered turmoil, and actions like the Montgomery Bus Boycott arose at the
same time as Brown, not before. See T. BRNcH, PAxRINo TnE WATERs (1988); R. KLUOER,
SneLE JusncE (1976); Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv.
61 (1988).
254. Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 217, at 745.
255. Id. at 748.
256. Id. at 750.
257. Id.
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law,218 by which he means pre-existing law 219 The main function of stare
decisis appears to legitimate Court decisions in the eyes of the "reasoning
classes" and "elites." ' 260 The agenda-limiting function of stare decisis is the
means to avoid "'radical and even revolutionary attacks on the legal status
quo," ' 261 apparently necessary to preserve the interests of the reasoning
classes and elites. For the Court to take it upon itself to remove from
constitutional debate fundamental constitutional conflicts in the interests of
the reasoning classes and perceived stability, however, seems as arrogant
and undemocratic as the Court's interpreting the Constitution expansively
or progressively
Combined with an endorsement of plenary presidential power and an
argument that the Court's legitimacy is determined by elites, Monaghan's
argument would support a substantively authoritarian government in the
United States. If the Court need only justify itself and respond to (power)
elites, then the Rule of Law embodied in the Constitution need not concern
itself with anything other than the concerns of an existing power elite and
its interests in stability and predictability Such thinking would support the
capture of the judiciary by ruling elites as a legitimate mechamsm of
government. And capture of such institutions as the judiciary is a charac-
teristic of authoritarian governments. 262
Another common argument in legal scholarship centers more generally
on judicial obedience to rules and texts. While the "ruleness of rules"
argument may mask authoritarian tendencies, or even be useful to anti-
authoritarian causes, 26 the substantively authoritarian danger lurking within
the formally authoritarian nature of rule-boundedness becomes clear in the
work of Frederick Schauer. Although Schauer does not consider the framers'
intent relevant, he, like Monaghan, would require absolute judicial obedience
to the constitutional text. Schauer has similarly argued that a common law
method of elaborating constitutional meaning is inapplicable when "the rule
is . . set forth in a fixed canonical form in an authoritative text, ' 264 such
as the Constitution. "In many respects the Constitution acts as a rule,
rigidly demanding of decisionmakers that they exclude from consideration
258. Id. at 752.
259. Id. at 750. Iromcally, the argument that divisive issues should be kept off the
constitutional agenda by means of stare decisis principles could support a Court refusing to
overrule Roe v. Wade. See Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. REv 105 (1989).
260. Monaghan, Stare Decists, supra note 217, at 749.
261. Id. at 750 (quoting Powell, Parchment Matters: A Medititation on the Constitution as
Text, 71 IowA L. REv 1427, 1433 (1986)).
262. See A. PEaLmuTrrTER, supra note 18, at 179-84.
263. See, e.g., Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. Ray 31 (1985).
264. Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 Wms. & MARY L. REv 41, 48 (1987)
[hereinafter Schauer, Text and Rule].
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certain potentially morally and politically relevant features of the case before
them."261
Schauer's vision of the world appears to be a Hobbesian "war of all
against all" that must be controlled through obedience to legal commands.
He has recently explicitly relied on the Hobbesian vision to justify his
argument that the "rule" of the first amendment is
a pnnciple of distrust, an embodiment of a Hobbesian view of the
world. Why would the "slippery slope" and its associated metaphors
figure so prominently in free speech discourse were there not some
specially close relationship between a theory of free speech and a theory
of governmental and judicial distrust?2"
For Schauer, rules are good because they provide an almost absolute
mechanism of predictability and control, as well as control over untrust-
worthy judges and other legal actors. Predictability is more important than
flexibility; obedience to rules is more important than justice. Rules, and the
words and texts that describe them, are usually absolutely determinate in
meaning and can and must be obeyed. Reference to normative reasons for
rules is not rule-following, and rule-following is what judges must do,
because judges must be controlled.
Suspicion of judges runs throughout Schauer's work as a justification for
rules as trumps. He has frequently written that while rules may interfere
with justice, they may "restrict misguided, incompetent, wicked, power-
hungry, or simply mistaken decisionmakers whose own sense of the good
might diverge from that of the system they serve,' " 7 and that although
"fuin attempting to disable wicked, misguided, or simply incompetent de-
cisionmakers from doing wrong, rules also disable wise, well-intentioned,
and capable decisionmakers from reaching the optimal results in individual
instances,"' ' 8 rules are essential as "barriers to the ... evil and danger-
ous." 269 His arguments for obedience to rules employ scare tactics in a
number of places. Do we want Oliver North deciding the meaning of
separation of powers? Do we want a recurrence of the Lochner Court?270
But as J.M. Balkin has observed, "[i]f we are ruled by law, we are ruled
265. Id. at 49.
266. Schauer, Henry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 397, 414
(1989) [hereinafter Schauer, Kalven].
267. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 543 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism].
268. Schauer, Rules, the Rule of Law and the Constitution, 6 CoNsT. Co itARy 69, 69
(1989) [hereinafter Schauer, Rules].
269. Schauer, Text and Rule, supra note 264, at 50.
270. To those who question the bindingness of constitutional rules, Schauer asks if we are
willing to have the cop on the beat interpret Miranda (which she does frequently, whether
Schauer thinks we like it or not) or Oliver North interpret separation of powers. Schauer,
Rules, supra note 268, at 79. This scare tactic argument isn't persuasive, and it is extremely
ngid and authoritarian in its own right. That is, it denies anyone the capacity to interpret a
democratic document.
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by texts, and if we are ruled by texts, we are ruled by readings of texts." 27'
Those texts can be "misread" or read in such a way as to embody
authoritarian precepts if the interpreter is herself authoritarian, or if she
has an authoritarian view of law. Thus rules are less of a restraint on the
wicked judge than Schauer would have us believe.
The abuse of power through demanding slavish adherence to rules is of
little moment to Schauer Instead, what he terms "particularism"-which
variously means unrestrained passion, common-law methods, balancing and
reference to different doctrines and rules-is the source of all danger.27 2 For
Schauer, the overriding threat to stability is created by permitting judges
"flexibility, adaptability to changing circumstances, empathy, and the other
benefits of particularistic adjudication. '273 Much of his argument for for-
malism and obedience to rules appears to be an authoritarian response to
the writings of femimst and humamst scholars who have urged consideration
of the contextual, human and painful aspects of a decision. 27 4 Schauer
frequently has rhetorical recourse to the parade of horribles to support his
claim that we must have rigid rules and avoid particularism. 275 "Context"
and "sympathy" mean the abandonment of rationality and principled
decisionmaking. Particularism would mean that the Nazis would have been
demed their first amendment right to march in Skokie, because emotion
would have overridden thought. The guilt of the accused would affect the
outcome of criminal procedure decisions, which it has in any case, despite
Professor Schauer's belief in rules. 27 6 Unprincipled, biased, arbitrary or
tyrannical decisionmaking is obviously a concern for all legal scholars, but
there is no basis for Schauer's conflation of particularism with morally
horrible, repressive results or for his confusion of particularism with out-
of-control emotionalism or hysteria. The basis for such conflation appears
to be a negative view of human nature, a belief that all emotion is bad and
irrational, and an authoritarian rejection of the imaginative and compas-
sionate.27 7 Empathic and responsible decisions do not require abandonment
271. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv.
911, 938 (1988). Radin makes a related argument about rules: rules and their meanings are
mutable, changeable and "embedded" in social practice. See Radin, supra note 116, at 807-
10, 819.
272. Schauer, Kalven, supra note 266, at 412-14.
273. See Schauer, Text and Rule, supra note 264, at 48.
274. He has specifically cited Michelman, Traces, supra note 206 and Henderson, Legality,
supra note 33, as representatives. Id. at 48 n.21; see also Minow, supra note 33; K. KARsT,
supra note 33.
275. Schauer, Kalven, supra note 266, at 397, 407-08, 413-14.
276. See Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STANi. L. REv 937, 968-74 (1985).
277 Schauer is not alone in his irrationality about emotion and empathy in legal decision-
making. See Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 MicH. L. Rv 2099 (1989); Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon"" The Human
Voice in Legal Rules, 66 TExAs L. REv 589 (1988).
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of pnnciple, balance or arbitranness.271
Control is the other authoritarian theme in Schauer's work. Law and
rules exist for control of otherwise unrestrained-and dangerous-passion
and the terrible uncertainties of existence. Legal institutions should exist as
"stabilizers and breaks," and they are necessary "institutions of re-
straint." 279 Only absolute obedience to rules and the demal of affectivity in
deciding cases protects us from uncertainty and abuse. Schauer argues that
categorical thinking, constraint and rule-following are all preferable to
responsiveness. Predictability is in itself "desirable," ° and "suboptimal
results" are tolerable in order to provide standardization and maintenance
of what he terms the "principle" of stability.21 To illustrate the need for
certainty, Schauer employs the hypothetical example of a faculty considering
the case of a student seeking an excused absence from an examination to
attend the funeral of his sister. Because it may be impossible to find a
principled rule-category covering requests for excuses in the case of deaths
arising in the future, as it is difficult to "distinguish" significant deaths
and losses, a rule prohibiting excuses to attend any funerals may be justified,
even if it is suboptimal. 2 2 Resigned acceptance of suboptimality and the
human pain it entails is necessary to preserve the value he places on precedent
and rules.
In a recent article, Schauer again argues for emphasizing "predictability,
stability, and constraint of decisiomnmakers commonly associated with deci-
sion according to rule" in legal thought.21 His vision of decision according
to rule always assumes that only one rule governs a case. The only alternative
is reference to something that is not a rule. His demal of multiple applicable
rules reflects a simplisticly authoritarian view of law and rule-bound deci-
sionmaking. Schauer prefers judicial obedience to narrowly interpreted
278. Unrestrained emotionalism is not inevitable and to charactenze the scholarship in this
way reflects a bias of considerable proportions. See Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "The
Progress of the Law", 10 CmaRozo L. REv. 3 (1988); Henderson, The Dialogue of Heart and
Head, 10 CAPDozo L. Rav. 123 (1988); Henderson, Legality, supra note 33; Minow, supra
note 33; Minow & Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDozo L. RV. 37 (1988); see also
infra notes 504-17 and accompanying text.
279. Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv 571, 604-05 (1987).
280. Id. at 597.
281. Id. at 601.
282. Id. at 590. In another bizarre passage, Schauer says that the burden of showing a
compelling interest in race-classification cases was inapplicable in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944): "But once that obligation [to show a compelling state interest] is created,
it may be possible, as in Korematsu, for the state to provide such a special justification, such
as the exigencies of war, based on reasons that themselves cannot be described in terms of a
classification based on race." Id. at 593 (emphasis in original). This is an incredible use of a
tragic case; history has demonstrated that there was no threat and that the internment of
Japanese Amrencans was racist. See JusTIcE DELAYED (P Irons ed. 1988); Matsuda, Repara-
tions, supra note 34.
283. Schauer, Formalism, supra note 267, at 547.
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commands, and the potential for repressive, oppressive or evil outcomes to
the alternative of capitulation to tyrannical judges. "To be formalistic
is to say something is not my concern, no matter how compelling it may
seem.' '2 4 This is "modesty" rather than moral irresponsibility or moral
obtuseness. To avoid the obvious objection that his vision would render
judges mere conduits for oppression, he suggests that we think of judging
in terms of "presumptive formalism," but his attachment to rule-bound
obedience remains strong. He posits only one "escape route that allowed
some results to be avoided when their consequences would be especially
outrageous. ' 285 It is unclear what would be "especially outrageous" under
Schauer's theory, and in any event, he goes on to write that even the
"especially outrageous" standard might be bad because "it would diminish
the amount of ruleness by placing more final authority in the decisionmaker
than in the rule." 2 6
The authoritarian currents of mistrust of people generally and judges in
particular, the demand for absolute obedience to absolute rules, and the
concern for predictability and control at the expense of concern for op-
pression and violence all render Schauer's scholarship formally authoritarian
with substantively authoritarian elements.
B. Substantive Authoritarianism in Legal Thought
Some forms of legal scholarship are more overtly authoritarian, containing
substantively authoritarian elements as part of their foundation. The work
of Judge Richard Posner and the work of "civic republican" scholars
contains substantively authoritarian elements. Across a number of dimen-
sions, Posner's work is the most explicitly authoritarian in current American
legal thought. Accordingly, this section first seeks to explicate Posner's
authoritarianism and then examines the substantively authoritarian danger
presented by the civic republicans.
Posner's work has been prodigious and influential. It has ranged from
economic interpretations of law, to law and literature, to jurisprudence. His
willingness to explore other fields of thought and legal scholarship has left
him strangely untouched, however. 287 Ultimately, he returns to the same
themes of suspicion of human nature, law as an instrument of social control,
the necessity of obedience to authority, and dismissal of human suffering.
Posner has bemoaned what he perceives to be a loss of respect for authority
284. Id. at 543.
285. Id. at 547.
286. Id. at 543.
287 See Weisberg, Entering With a Vengeance: Posner on Law and Literature, 41 STAr.
L. REv 1597 (1989); White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARv L. REv
2014 (1989).
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(including legal authority), has defined authority and law as power and
nothing more, and has repeatedly indicated an indifference to, if not a
punitive attitude toward, human suffering. The tone of Posner's writings
and the scholarship he relies on to support his arguments often suggest that
his views of human nature and law reflect a substantively authoritarian
bent. As a result, several scholars have noted that some of his work is
authoritarian. 28 In the introduction to his latest work, The Problems of
Jurisprudence, he writes that the book "will provoke .. the political
activists who want to move the law sharply to the left or to the right. It
will be criticized by the Left as authoritarian and complacent, and by the
Right as cynical and amoral."n'  Despite his effort to discredit his critics,
however, the book more clearly reveals the very authoritarianism he seeks
to deny. Posner relies heavily on sociobiological and "vulgar" Darwinist
theories of human nature to justify his arguments against a wide range of
jurisprudential positions and for a Chicago-school economic approach to
law. Social Darwinism combined with laissez-faire economics has character-
ized a number of American right-wing authoritarian movements, 290 thus, at
a nummum, linking Posner's thought to the political history of authoritar-
iaism.
For Posner, the state of nature, "red in tooth and claw," would actually
exist without law. Life would indeed be the Hobbesian nightmare as people,
driven by impulse, would play life out on a number of revenge themes, 29'
making real the portrayal of life as nasty, brutish and short. Without law,
the social chaos of the war of all against all is inevitable. Law is civilization's
answer to never-ending revenge; it is revenge constrained.292 Law is the
answer to the Hobbesian threat because it demands obedience and compli-
;nce; any other alternative is sentimental, deluded "romanticism. " 29 Ac-
cording to Posner, justice, the virtue of law, is itself rooted in a Hobbesian-
Darwinian world of revenge and survival:
Stressing the primitive character of corrective and retributive justice-
the roots of these concepts in behavior having plausible sociobiological
interpretations-is a necessary corrective to the common belief that
Anstotelian and Kantian ideas of justice are more "moral" than prag-
matic and instrumental views. Although Aristotle and Kant obviously
had no opportunity to read The Origin of Species, their ideas about
288. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 287; West, Authority, supra note 180; West, Law,
Literature, and the Celebration of Authority, 83 Nw U.L. REv. 977 (1989); West, Submission,
Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HAZv L. REv 1499 (1986).
289. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 129, at 32.
290. See R. HoFsrTATER, SOCIAL DAwiNism IN AjdicA THOUGHT (1955); S. Lu'sar,
supra note 20, at 169-72; S. Li'sET & E. RAAB, supra note 75, at 432-33, 451.
291. R. POSNER, LAW AND LrrERATU: A MISUNDERSTOOD RLAION 26-32 (1988) [herein-
after, R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE].
292. Id. at 25-33.
293. Id.
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remedial justice-the justice of sanctions for transgression-are rooted
in a view of human nature, as quintessentially vengeful, that is highly
compatible with a Darwinian view.29
Even "rights," in Dworkin's strong sense of having a right such that it
would be wrong to interfere with its exercise, are based in selfish, competitive
human nature:
"[R]ights" is a primitive rather than a sophisticated concept. The
sense we all have of having certain rights it would be wrong to deprive
us of is a primitive feature of our psychological make up-one as well
developed in children and in the inhabitants of primitive societies as it
is in modern American adults, and found in animals as well. Survival
in a competitive environment requires some minimum sense of the
essential things that are one's own to keep or dispose of as one will,
and of a readiness to fight for this control The creature that does
not feel a sense of moralistic indignation when another creature seeks
to take from it the things that are essential to its survival is not likely
to survive and reproduce, so there will be a selection in favor of creatures
genetically endowed with such a sense." 5
Posner conflates rights with survival and is apparently concerned only with
property rights and rights against physical aggression. But it is easy to
demonstrate that the strong rights such as freedom of expression, which
are considered important by Dworkin and other rights theorists, have little
to do with species survival, historically or at present; people survive phys-
ically in tyrannical cultures without freedom of speech. Posner's statement
is not only a gross oversimplification of the meaning of rights, but also
empirically suspect in terms of our knowledge of developmental psychology,
anthropology, history, and biology
Posner's view of human nature, while consistently negative, is supported
by inconsistent claims. At times, Posner seems to believe that human beings
are driven by impulse and genetics-he appears to have adopted his own
version of Freud's Helmholtzian drive theory, without the ego. For example,
he has asserted, without citing authority, that "most human choices are
determined by preferences that have their roots in instinct-the instinct to
survive, the instinct to reproduce." 29 At other times, he appears to endorse
sociobiology wholeheartedly as a science of human behavior "attested by
sober philosophers of science. ' 297 As a result of his interest-and faith-in
294. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 129, at 331.
295. Id. (footnote omitted).
296. Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARv.
L. Rav 1431, 1442 (1986) [hereinafter Posner, A Reply]; see I. YALOM, supra note 188, at
288-89.
297. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 129, at 332. Posner fails to cite any of the
scientific criticisms of sociobiology's claims, preferring to suggest that objections to the field
are political. For works Posner could have cited, see P KrrcHER, VAULTING A mrroN (1985)
(philosophical critique); Gould, Cardboard Darwinism, N.Y Review of Books 33 (Sept. 25,
1986); Gould, Biological Potential vs. Biological Determinism, in THE SOCIOBiOLOGY DEBATE
344 (A. Caplan ed. 1978); Hubbard, The Political Nature of "Human Nature", in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEx DIFFERENCE 63 (D. Rhode ed. 1990).
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sociobiological claims, Posner almost casually asserts a number of startling
propositions about humans. He states, for example, that a belief in free
will or freedom of choice is an illusion with "survival value" that "may
be hard-wired into our brains." 29 Yet, the notion of free will or freedom
of choice is a Western one; apparently non-Western humans-and Western
humans for most of their history-have survived and flourished without
this genetic illusion.
At still other times Posner appears to be a reductiomstic behaviorist. He
asserts that concepts such as mind, intent and presumably, self are the
products of our ignorance about phenomena rather than real entities.299 This
assertion, of course, is nothing new in thought; rather, it is the conclusion
that Posner draws from this observation that is authoritarian. He opines,
'Economic' man, [sic] . . is a person whose behavior is completely
determined by incentives; his rationality is no different from that of a
pigeon or a rat. The economic task from the perspective of wealth maxi-
mization is to influence his incentives so as to maximize his output. m °° At
yet other times, his view of human nature is that of selfish individualism.
In his book on jurisprudence, he uses John Mackie to critique commum-
taran and feminist theories of morality. According to Posner's summary
of Mackie, such theories "cut ... against the genetic grain; we are selfish,
individualistic animals .... ',301 This easy declaration should make one
shudder; it ignores the fact that individualism as we understand it did not
even arise until the Enlightenment. People in numerous cultures and contexts
would not even understand the concept of atomistic individualism. 0-2 And,
finally, there is his view of humans as driven to retaliation and revenge
against one another, in what would, without law, be a never-ending blood
feud.
In addition to his reduction of philosophical systems to the probable
outcome of sociobiological species survival, Posner has appropriated phil-
osophical notions of "practical reason" and "pragmatism" and redefined
or exaggerated their aspects to support his arguments for wealth maximi-
zation and scientific law and judicial decisionmaking. He observes that
judicial choice is always a result of practical reason and pragmatic choice,
which certainly seems reasonable, although it is difficult, given his view of
human nature, to know who or what is exercising the choice. Posner
correctly observes that rules are not absolute in the way that Schauer views
298. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 129, at 178.
299. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 868 (1988) [hereinafter
Posner, Skepticism].
300. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 129, at 382 (emphasis added).
301. Id. at 417.
302. See J. RANDALL, THE MAKmrG OF TE MODERN MIND (1940); R. ROSALDO, supra note
51, at 25-27, 74-87.
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them and that judges do make-and have to make-their own policy
decisions. But the pragmatic Posnenan judge will have recourse to science-
read microeconomic theory-in interpreting rules and deciding cases, as
opposed to hopelessly muddled political or moral considerations. Moreover,
because law is a mechanism of social control, the more the judge knows
about cause and effect, the more rigorously she can use law to control
human behavior. 3 3 Behaviorism is the referent: Posner asserts that predicting
human behavior is usually accurately and easily accomplished, but does not
acknowledge the vast literature contradicting his claim.304
Certainly Posner's view of human nature is negative and reflects an
ideology compatible with right-wing authoritarian thought. But one could
argue, as Posner himself does, that because of his absolute dedication to
free markets and choice, he is far from being an authoritarian. Economic
theory and libertarianism of the Posnerian variety is what guarantees us all
freedom from oppression. Although this argument is inconsistent with his
arguments about manipulation of behavior and about law as social control
and constrained revenge, Posner does not address the inconsistency. Rather,
he is a self-proclaimed "classic liberal," one of the least likely authoritarian
figures.305 Government is the power to fear; it must be mimmal, and should
regulate no more than absolutely necessary 306 Further, as a "libertarian,"
Posner consistently raises the spectre of direct government oppression,
overlooking the possibility of authoritarian oppression due to government
omission or the government's active or passive support of the dominance
303. Posner, Skepticism, supra note 299, at 868-71.
304. Id. at 871. Posner blithely asserts that "[p]arents, economists, psychologists, marriage
counselors, and probation officers all have the experience of being able to predict correctly
what another person will do even when the person himself is genuinely undecided" and cites
Hume as support for the proposition. Id. Although it is true that we all might have the
experience of accurately predicting what someone will do, there are countless times when we
predict inaccurately.
305. His response to Robin West's critical review of LAw ANiD Lr rnAium, supra note 291,
is telling. In some of the great run-on sentences in law review history, Posner uses selective
quotes and irony to argue that he is a libertarian, not an authoritarian. Posner, Gregor Samsa
Replies, 83 Nw U.L. REv 1022, 1024 (1989). His response is both humorous and angry:
[I]f only we realized that the "rule of law," and the market, and prisons and
police, and convention, and differences among persons in aptitude and character,
and the bourgeois values, and prudence, and asking students questions in class,
and the monuments of Western civilization (including that reactionary sexist
work, the Nicomachean Ethics), and maturity and professionalism and expertise
and respect and tradition, and, in just two words, institutions and constraints,
or, in a single word, "liberalism," were all just so much authoritarian bullshit-
then we could get on with the task (and it's a lot easier than you think) of
building a warm, loving, caring, open, hopeful, hugging, unmediated, hierarchy-
free, prelinguistic, empathic, affective (but not sentimental-liberals are senti-
mental), happy, herbivorous, weaponless, whole-grain, solar-powered, polymor-
phously perverse, classless, Utopian society for the Whole Human Family.
Id. at 1025 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
306. Posner, A Reply, supra note 296, at 1431-42, 1447.
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by powerful elites over others. Posner's interpretation of libertarianism,
with its obsessive focus on government power, seems to destroy his ability
to acknowledge, state-permitted infliction of human pain and oppression.
He would not see a problem with the perpetuation of racism in the private
sphere or with the private violence against women and children that are the
result of government inaction or complicity.3 7 Because the authoritarian
state has to rely on others to help it maintain control, Posner's avowed
dedication to libertarianism is suspect.
The more substantively authoritarian attitudes supporting Posner's argu-
ments are clear in his tone and characterization of problems. Posner has
written that rape is the result of an inefficient market for sex.308 He has
stated that battered wives stay m the battering relationship, because staying
married is value-maximizing: if there is no better alternative in the market-
place to being beaten, the choice is rational.3 °9 There are, of course,
alternatives, including enforcing criminal statutes, taking the crime as sen-
ously as we do other assaults, providing support and counselling for battered
women and battering men and so forth.310 But this might involve government
action and expenditure, which leads Posner to prefer the injustice of
omission3  and the resulting perpetuation of violence against women in the
United States to the alternative of government assistance. Posner states,
"We ought to be wary about embracing a system in which government
breaks up families to protect wives against themselves. ' 31 2 Taking seriously
the crimes of battery and assault with serious bodily injury does not logically
entail "breaking up families," and blanung the victim of abuse manifests
a complete failure of human understanding, empathy or compassion on
Posner's part.313
Posner's opinion in the DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, 14 a child abuse case, also demonstrates his authoritarian
307. Posner, of course, is not alone here. See K. KARsT, supra note 33, at 75 (discussing
Alexander Bickel's criticism of the Warren Court as '"planting the seed of tyranny"'). As
Karst observes, however, the pnvate violence and discrimination of the KKK and Jim Crow
practices "acquired the influence of a pseudogovernment." Id. Thus, oppression is maintained
with government complicity.
308. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 CoLum. L. REv. 1193, 1198-99
(1985); see also Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HAgv. L. Rzv 1849, 1879 & n.109 (1987)
(developing theory based on human flourishing to help determine what ought not to be bought
and sold).
309. Posner, A Reply, supra note 296, at 1444 ("If she stays, it may be because, all things
considered, the feasible alternatives are even worse.").
310. See Littleton, supra note 23, at 52-56.
311. For a generaf discussion of injustice, see Shklar, supra note 15.
312. Posner, A Reply, supra note 296, at 1445 (emphasis added).
313. Perhaps one could demonstrate that the lost work time, the neglect of children, and
the ultimate homicides that result in many battenng cases are so costily that they are not
wealth-maximizing to society, however.
314. 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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attitude and illustrates his beliefs. In DeShaney, a mother sued the State of
Wisconsin for damages under section 1983 for reckless failure to take action
to protect a child whom state social workers knew was being beaten by his
father. In an opinion holding that there was no cause of action, Posner
wrote that "the state's failure to protect people from private violence .
is not a deprivation of constitutionally protected property or liberty." 313
Consistent with his libertarian position, Posner asserted that the rmmmal
state was commanded by the framers of the Constitution, yet the state
becomes so mimmal for Posner as to be virtually nonexistent: "The Con-
stitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties" 316 with few
exceptions, and "ft]he state does'not have a duty enforceable by the federal
courts to maintain a police force or a fire department, or to protect children
from their parents.' '317 This leaves Posner's vision of the purpose of the
state-or law-unclear, to say the least; even Nozick's minimal state rec-
ogmzes the need for a police force. 318 If law and the state exist to prevent
private vengeance, the state should have a duty to protect against private
vengeance and violence. This contradiction may be more understandable in
light of Posner's expressed attitudes to human suffering. In DeShaney,
Posner cited an 1898 case on causation, 3 9 reasoning that because Joshua
DeShaney would have sustained the injuries if the state department of social
services had never existed, the state's involvement did not increase the
probability of injury to him in any non-trivial sense; the state did not cause
the risk to Joshua; and no special relationship between the state and Joshua
was created by awareness that the child was in danger. In what appears to
be a terribly callous way of stating a point, Posner wrote, "The men who
framed the original Constitution and the fourteenth amendment were wor-
ried about government's oppressing the citizenry rather than about its failing
to provide adequate social services. 2 0
Posner's punitive attitude to society's "losers," is breezy dislmssals of
human suffering, and his obsessive preoccupation with "the government" as
the sole source of abuses of power and oppression, rather than an agent that
can either oppress or liberate, seems to reflect a substantively authoritarian
outlook. Moreover, an amoral jurisprudence focused on economic science and
power can easily become authoritarian; when combined both with a funda-
mentally suspicious and unsympathetic view of human nature and a view of
law as a mechamsm of control, it is substantively authoritarian. Holmes, to
315. Id. at 301.
316. Id.
317. Id. (emphasis added).
318. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 57-87 (1974).
319. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 302 (citing Weeks v. MeNulty, 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S.W 809
(1898)).
320. Id. at 301.
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Posner the most pragmatic of judges and one worthy of emulation,3 21 deferred
to power and science because he felt no moral engagement.3 22 Posner's world
is very similar to Holmes' world at its worst.
In contrast to the extreme individualism present in Posner's work, a
relatively recent strand of constitutional scholarship emphasizes the primacy
of the community and argues for restoring civic -virtue and participatory
democracy in constitutional law. The civic republican scholarship may be,
in part, a reaction to the atomism in certain liberal theories, to the Posnenan
view of the world as populated by non-altrustic, self-interested individuals,
or to a perceived breakdown of social solidarity and dissatisfaction with
late twentieth-century liberalism in the United States.323 Scholars also have
responded to the connection thesis and ethic of care developed in feminist
thought 32 and to a renewed concern with conceptions of the good, or
virtues, in political life.325 Community, belonging, caring for,, and respon-
sibility to others are important to anti-authoritananism and human fulfill-
ment and had been overlooked by many legal and moral scholars.
Unfortunately, the history of the republican tradition in the United States
is one of intolerance and xenophobia; if historically- oppressed people are
skeptical of the argument for the republican tradition, it is for a reason.3 26
321. See, e.g., Posner, Skepticism, supra note 299, at 865-71; R. PosNER, JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 129, at 15-26; R. POSNER, LAW AND LiTERATuRE, supra note 291, at 281-89. In
his dissent to a decision denying a challenge to a company's fetal protection policy, Posner
waxes eloquent about Justice Holmes, although Holmes' relevance to Posner's decision in the
actual case is hard to discern. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886, F.2d 871, 903 (1989), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
322. See generally Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. Rnv. 787 (1989).
323. Fallon, What is Republicanism, and is it Worth Revivmg?, 102 HA~v. L. Rnv. 1695,
1695-97 (1989). For a sociological work making the argument against atomism in the context
of the white, upper middle-class, see R. BEL.LA, R. MADSEN, W SutUVAN, A. SwMER & S.
TiPTON, HAarrs OF Tim HEART (1985); and Harding, Toward a Darkly Radiant Vision of
America's Truth, CRoss CURRENTS (Spnng 1987) (criticism for onussion of people of color
from study). For the argument from political philosophy, see M. SANDEL, LiBERAISM AIM
THE Luarrs OF JUsTIcE (1982); and Sandel, supra note 190. For the argument in political
theory, see B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984). Another influential work has been
MacIntyre's argument for restoration of Anstotelean virtues in moral thinking, with appropriate
historical updates, in A. MAcINT RE, ASMR VnRmE (2d ed. 1984). The emphasis this schol-
arship places on "community" may stand for our wistful desire to return to a past Golden
Age of certainty, belonging, civility and care-an age that never has existed for everyone; a
desire for an ideal nurturing family that never was; or a desire to overcome the social isolation,
groundlessness and uncertainty of life in the United States in the post-modern (and post-
hegemonic?) era. Certainty, belonging, civility and care are all important to human beings,
but so are change, conflict and growth. To the extent that the desire to have certainty and
belonging can lead to authoritarian conformity, the civic republicanism scholarship creates a
real risk of substantive authoritananism.
324. 'The connection thesis is West's terni'used to identify feminst thought emphasizing
women's connection to other persons. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. Ray.
1 (1988). The interrelationship of individuals as a criteria for moral thought emerged from C.
GMnOAN, IN A Dm'arrNT VoicE (1982).
325. See A. MAcINTYRE, supra note'323.
326. See Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591 (1988).
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In rushing to rescue notions of community and cooperation from the jaws
of selfish individualism, civic republican scholarship often argues for con-
ditions that would facilitate substantive authoritarianism. The substantively
authoritarian danger can arise in communitariansm either by abandoning
individuals or by failing to perceive the need for empathy with those who
differ from ourselves. 327
Phillip Selzmck has noted that "a communitarian morality . is not at
its core a philosophy of liberation. The central value is not freedom or
independence but belonging. "32 As Kenneth Karst has so eloquently argued,
belonging to communities is important to us all,329 but the "community"
will not incorporate new people without conflict and struggle. 330 Indeed, the
"civic conception" of law and the "participatory ideal" can quickly justify
a lack of compassion toward, or the continued oppression of, those not
belonging. 3 1 To the extent the community's values trump the liberal concerns
for individual dignity and rights, the threat of substantive authoritarianism
increases.
The civic republican scholarship raises this danger in several ways. First,
there have been arguments that the community's good supersedes the
individual's good. Second, the notion of encouraging virtue based on a
teleological view of human progress has historically justified conventionalist,
conformist tendencies that can produce substantive authoritarianism. Third,
and related to encouraging virtue, the notion of a public life in which all
engage in discussing political issues assumes a shared discourse and values
that can be exclusionary.
Suzanna Sherry has written that the civic republican ideal "exalts the
good of the whole over the good of its individual members. ' 332 Professor
Sunstein has written that the republican ideal includes a "willingness of
citizens to subordinate their private interests to the general good."3 33 Yet,
the question of the public good as opposed to private interests or pressures33
is left tantalizingly unanswered. This ormssion is unfortunate, for quite
obviously the definition of public good historically has been determned by
powerful and dominant elites, and it can easily be corrupted into confor-
mism, intolerance and moralism. 35 It is not madly libertarian-or original-
to note that without some narrowing definition of the community good,
327. See K. KA.SRT, supra note 33; infra text accompanying notes 513-15.
328. Selzmck, The Idea of a Communitartan Morality, 75 CAns. L. REv 445, 454 (1987)
(emphasis in original).
329. K. KAi~sT, supra note 33, at 189-96.
330. Id. at 215.
331. Selzmck, supra note 328, at 456-57
332. Sherry, supra note 31, at 551.
333. Sunstem, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. Ray 29, 31 (1985).
334. Id. at 52.
335. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 326.
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exalting the good of the whole over individuals can easily justify repression
and substantive authoritarianism. 336
Perhaps Sherry's writings most clearly demonstrate the dangers of em-
phasizing the community good m civic republicanism. In her effort to equate
civic republican ideals with a "feminine vision," Sherry sought to explain
the early jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor as embodying proper "com-
munitanan" ideals. Justice O'Connor's "conservative" willingness to agree
with cases limiting the fourth and fifth amendment rights of criminal
defendants is explicable for Sherry because the community trumps the
individual defendant in such cases: "If the community is more important
than individual rights, it is quite predictable that Justice O'Connor would
be a strong law and order proponent: she will protect the community from
crime even at the expense of the individual rights of criminal defendants. '37
Of course, "protecting the community from crime" can be a justification
for a number of substantively authoritarian, coercive practices, including
police detention and "rousting" of African-Amencans in white suburbs and
the government internment of members of "suspect" groups. To rebut that
suggestion, perhaps, Sherry has argued that Justice O'Connor's commum-
tarian view encompasses "[d]ismantling the barriers erected by race discrim-
ination or religious favoritism," because those barriers prevent individuals
from exercising their "right" to full community membership. 338 But this
"right" does not connect directly to civic virtue notions of politics that
require shared values and discourse. 39
Sherry has also argued that the feminine vision is concerned with ensuring
public morality at the expense of pluralism and tolerance. Thus, the fermne
point of view is that "[p]ornography conveys a view of women that is
simply unmoral. ' ' 34° The reason why this view of women is immoral,
however, could rest on a number of conventionalist or oppressive assump-
tions about sexuality and women, not upon the radical feminst proposition
that pornography is immoral because it harms women. At another point,
Sherry conflates a "caring" society with a "virtuous" one and then resorts
to "tolerance" as a virtue that will constrain the state from coercively
336. See, e.g., Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986);
Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY
L. Rav. 57, 67 (1987).
337. Sherry, supra note 31, at 604. For a discussion of the perspective offered by female
judges, see Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 LAw & INEQU ALrY 159 (1986). Sherry's vision
also overlooks the fact that the community itself may have an interest in protection from
unmonitored coercive force, and thus it is not inevitable that a person with communitanan
concerns would become less concerned with protections against government force.
338. Sherry, supra note 337, at 166.
339. See infra text accompanying notes 343-49.
340. Sherry, supra note 337, at 166.
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enforcing a vision of the good life.341'Caring, responsiveness and connection
are important to anti-authoritariamsm, but Sherry's portrayal of these
characteristics often raises the specter of oppression instead.
To counteract an immediate aversive response by liberal-progressive scho-
lars to a concept of "communitarian" jurisprudence, many scholars, in-
cluding Sunstern and Michelman, have refrained republicanism to stand for
strong participatory democracy, self-determination and dispersion of deci-
sionmaking authority. 42 The notion of law as self-constituted authority, as
something other than a top-down command, is a break from authoritari-
amsm, as is diffusion of authority. But a difficulty exists in a model
featunng articulation of community values through virtue and dialogue. 43
According to Sherry, accomplishing dialogue requires shared values and a
shared discourse that in turn requires internalization of those values and
discourses.3" Alisdair MacIntyre, who has sought to restore the virtues to
human moral experience, has opined that the Anstotelean polis depended
upon agreement on virtues. 341 If "civic virtue" is essential to participation
in political decisionmaking, and virtues must be agreed upon, the potential
for authoritarian domination of those who are different increases. That is,
the requirement of shared values will not prevent what Sherry has termed
"aggressive majoritariamsm" and may have the opposite effect. For those
whose value discourses are different, communication may be impossible as
well: They may seem incoherent, unintelligible or repulsive. Pluralism, which
has been criticized by civic republicans, is a vision of a community of
diversity-not the best, perhaps, but it is one that does not require obedience
to shared values, discourses and experiences; it is one embodiment of
tolerance that is crucial to the anti-authoritarian project.
Another problem arises from the civic republicans' arguments for dia-
logue. Individuals must have the ability to participate in the relevant
discursive community. One immediate authoritarian problem is raised by
the fact that the argument for "English only" laws has often been phrased
in terms of the ability to participate in American politics, for example,
when the real reason for enacting English only laws is nativist and xeno-
phobic. But even without the xenophobic streak of "English only," for
those whose experience, language, or both is not encompassed by the
dominant discourse, participation in the dialogue will be difficult if not
341. Id. at 169. For a critique of Sherry's version of "tolerance" in the context of an
argument that tolerance is a liberal value, see Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAI:.
L. REv. 305, 338-42 (1990).
342. See Sunstem, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1989); Michelman,
Traces, supra note 206; Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8.
343. See Sherry, supra note 31, at 552-55; Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at
1526-32.
344. Sherry, supra note 31, at 555-56.
345. A. MACINTYRn, supra note 323, at 155.
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impossible. Although Michelman's vision of legal practice rests on "bringing
to legal-doctrinal presence the hitherto absent voices of emergently self-
conscious social groups[,]"3 those voices must be able to communicate.
While Michelman correctly suggests that the civil rights movement managed
to "penetrate the dominant consciousness" and have some influence in
altering the discourse of equal protection, the effectiveness of the civil rights
struggle did not rest on language and discussion alone 47 Further, much of
African-American experience and meaning is still, over thirty years later,
outside the dominant frameworks of discourse and law4s4 To be understood
by the dominant discursive community nught involve the translation of
experience into terms the dominant discourse apprehends-for example, the
translation into rights of the oppression of African-Americans during the
1950s and 1960s. Putting aside the risks of co-optation such translation may
entail, translating from one discourse to another in order to participate in
dialogue is not always possible or believed: consider the historical absence
of women's and others' voices from donunant discourses such as law, legal
scholarship, and philosophy and the frustration and feeling-craziness of
those scholars brave enough to try to convey these meanings and experi-
ences. 49
To circumvent the very real authoritarian implications of civil republican-
ism, Sherry, Michelman and Sunstem all have had recourse to tolerance
and rights. Blending community-based and individually-based concerns has
promise: Michelman has argued that for a proper, non-authoritarian un-
derstanding of republicanism, one must promote citizenship for every mem-
ber of the community by providing each member "admission to full and
effective participation in the various arenas of public life."350 Participation
in the dialogue must take place on conditions of freedom; changes in one's
understanding as a result of dialogue must take place in circumstances "not
. experienced as coercive, or invasive, or [as] a violation of one's identity
or freedom.""'' Laws chosen under these conditions would more likely be
liberating than oppressing.
A single vision of what is good and right imposed in the name of the
public good is both frightemng and promising: It is frightening for the
346. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at 1529.
347. See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. Rnv. 1331, 1381-82 (1988).
348. See id. at 1349.
349. For a particularly powerful example of this, written with the author's voice counter-
pointed by doubt, see West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Li'es,'3 Wis. WoMEN's L.J.
81 (1987); see also Coombe, Room for Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical
Legal Studies, 14 LAw & Soc. INQumy 69, 100-08 (1989) (discussing symbolic practices and
power).
350. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at 1533.
351. Id. at 1527.
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reasons already stated and promising because it rejects the libertarian Posner-
like vision of completely privatizAng the good and disabling the state from
seeking to better people's lives. Currently, however, the difficulties presented
by a tyranny of the majority or of the "general will" have not been
addressed adequately by pure communitanans; the emphasis on community
values can justify a great deal of repression and intolerance. Progressive
participatory democracy, or "dialogic," scholars have had difficulty within
their models when community values lead to banning books and punishing
homosexuals35 2 without recourse to arguments based on notions of liberal
'principles and grounded on individual rights and dignity "I Civic republican
scholars, in recognizing this problem, have found that they have to modify,
modernize, or meld the tradition with that of rights and principles to avoid
the majoritarian difficulty
C. Authoritarianism and the Court
Michelman and West have both identified authoritarian elements in the
Court's current constitutional decisionmaking that are consistent with the
description of formal authoritarianism, and both have demonstrated the
formally authoritarian orientation of various scholars. 54 For example, Mich-
elman has argued that a "constitutional jurisprudence" '355 based on
"positvism 3 6 in the most reductiomst sense is authoritarian in the formal
sense. Michelman has observed that courts can be authoritarian by taking
a stance of complete deference to "the prior normative utterance, express
or implied, of extra-judicial authority 11s7 Although Michelman uses the
notion of "popular authoritarianism" in his critique of Bruce Ackerman's
argument that the Supreme Court may break with the past only when "the
People" decide to make a break with past constitutional understandings,58
he does not note that Ackerman's process argument could require that
courts obey the dictates of legally embodied popular majoritarian hatred,
dislike or prejudice against a group. This link between formal and substan-
tive authoritarianism in scholarship and decisionmaking is the subject of
this section. By examining cases and the Court's reasoning therein, this
section suggests that the Court is following an authoritarian path.
352. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 33; Michelman, Traces, supra note 206.
353. Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HtAv L. REv. 1
(1976); Minow, supra note 33; Michelman, Traces, supra note 206.
354. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8; West, Constitutionalism, supra note 3.
355. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at 1496, 1520-21.
356. Id. at 1514 n.86.
357 Id. at 1496.
358. Id. at 1519-24.
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The opinions of Justice White and Chief Justice Bukger in Bowers v.
Hardwick'9 foreshadowed the rise in the Court's authoritarianism, not only
in terms of results clearly lacking in empathy for human suffering, acknowl-
edgement of human dignity and an indifference to punishment, but in terms
of a tone and a form of reasoning that is substantively authoritarian.160
Justice Powell's opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp 6' crystalized the Court's
growing support for capital punishment and its indifference to racism in
the United States by rejecting strong evidence that the Georgia capital
sentencing structure discriminated against defendants on the basis of their
victim's race, devalued African-American lives, and perpetuated government-
approved racism.362 In its ruling in McCleskey, the Court stated that there
was no "logical" reason to distinguish racism or sexism from other biases
in sentencing, including capital sentencing, and further suggested that there
actually wasn't any problem of racism in sentencing at all, despite the
evidence presented. This indicates at best an attitude of indifference to
racism.3 63 It appears that by the 1988-89 term, the Supreme Court had
adopted the jurisprudence of Bowers and McCleskey taking not only a
conservative turn but also a substantively authoritarian one.364 Rather than
being conservative in the sense of caution and respect for tradition, 65 much
of the Court's language and many of its decisions36 provide evidence of a
substantively authoritarian attitude on the part of many members of the
Court. The Court has variously justified its decisions as deference to state
authorities, obedience to legal commands and support of majoritanamsm.3 67
The Court has also engaged in nativist, suspicious and stereotypical reasoning.
359. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 1 omit discussion of Justice Powell's opinion, because his
concurrence expressed concern with the punishment for homosexual sodomy. The Georgia
statute made sodomy a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison; quite obviously,
there are other punitive results from a felony conviction, including loss of the right to vote.
360. See Henderson, Legality, supra note 33, at 1638-49 (discussing the opinions in Bowers).
361. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
362. See Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court,
101 HAzy. L. REv. 1388 (1988).
363. Id. at 1409-10, 1416.
364. See West, Constitutionalism, supra note 3; Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned
to the Right, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 2; see also Brisbin, supra note 4 (arguing
Reagan appointees are concerned with coercive application of state power to maintain social
order; junsprudence is one of statism and politics of management, not conservatism); cf.
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 61 ("It is tempting to view the Rehnquist Court's decisions
simply as a product of the conservative views of a majority of the current Justices
[but t]o view the Rehnquist Court entirely in ideological terms is to ignore" other forces
shaping constitutional law.).
365. As Mark Tushnet has observed, "In its most admirable form, Burkean conservatism
leads to a resigned acceptance of the change that it knows is inevitable. The Burkean
will not battle to the death " Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in
Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL L. Ray 683, 694 (1985).
366. See infra notes 368-85 and accompanying text.
367. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 46.
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Prejudice and punitiveness are frequently' subtextual, if not immediately
obvious, in the Court's opinions. Along the way, the Court has enhanced
the power of government to command, to punish, to control, and to ignore
social wrongs. It has also dimnished the power of individuals and govern-
ments-state and federal-to attempt to correct the evils of subordination
and oppression.
Thus, in the 1988-89 term, the Court decided that the government could
execute young people sixteen years of age 68 and mentally retarded people. 69
It held that the government owes no duty to protect children, its most
vulnerable citizens, from "private violence. 3 70 The Court also sharply
curtailed the ability of governments and citizens to battle racial or gender
discrimination. The Court struck down a minority business set-aside program
meant to rectify past discrimination,371 and in other cases held that white
males who were not parties to Title VII litigation could challenge affirmative
action consent decrees,3 72 although women were barred from litigating the
discriminatory result of a discriminatory contract through a narrow reading
of the limitations period. 73 The Court also held that section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act did not allow suits for racially discriminatory breaches of
contract.3 74 A majority held that drug testing of customs employees without
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion of drug use was constitutionally
permissible.37s Further, the Court created limitations in federal habeas
cases 376 that became the grounds for the virtual -end of federal habeas relief
in 1990.377 The Court also came close to overruling Roe v Wade in a
decision that virtually ignored women's concerns. 37
The shift continued in the 1989-90 term. 379 A majority of the Court
rejected almost fifty years of con stitutional doctrine in holding that the free
368. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
369. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
370. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
371. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
372. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
373. Lorance v AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
374. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
375. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
376. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). For a criticism of Teague, see Hoffmann,
The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 1989 Sup
CT. REV 165; see also Note, Resolving Retroactivity After Teague v. Lane, 65 IND. L.J. 651
(1990) (proposing a new exception to the Teague retroactivity test based on an individual
rather than a categorical approach).
377 Teague held that any "new" rules of constitutional criminal procedure or rules
announced after the defendant's conviction which became "final" under state law would no
longer be grounds for federal habeas relief. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1068. In Butler v. McKellar,
110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990), "new" rules were defined as anything not commanded by prior case
law. Id. at 1216.
378. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); see Olsen, supra note
259.
379. For a similar observation characterizing the decisions of the 1989-90 term as "illiberal,"
see West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HAgv L. REv 41 (1990) [hereinafter
West, Freedom].
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exercise clause did not protect Native American church members from legal'
disadvantages resulting from their sacramental use of, peyote.8 0 Police may
establish sobriety checkpoints, stopping and detaining motorists without
probable cause.3"' Police can enter premises without a warrant if they
reasonably, although mistakenly, believe a person has the authority to
consent to their entry and search;8 2 the government is not bound at all by
the fourth amendment if it acts beyond the territorial boundaries of the
United States.38 3 A bare majority did uphold the F.C.C.'s minority prefer-
ence in granting broadcasting licenses and privileges against an equal pro-
tection challenge, but not without vigorous dissents.8 4 The Court also
continued to approve almost every death penalty scheme it considered.3 5
At times, the Court has arguably reached substantively authoritarian
results through formally authoritarian means. This seems evident in the
Court's opinion in Patterson v McLean Credit Union,38 6 as well as in the
decisions on federal habeas. In Patterson, Justice Kennedy took a formally
authoritarian stance toward contract damages for racial discrimination and
harassment under section 1981. Patterson had been set for reargument on
whether the Court should overrule Runyon v. McCrary,3s7 a 1976 case that
held that section 1981 permitted private damage actions for racially discrim-
inatory breaches of contract. Faced with resounding evidence that Congress
intended section 1981 to apply to private actions, the Court would have
had great difficulty overruling Runyon. Unable to overrule the decision
completely, Kennedy and the majority proceeded to redefine the elements
of section 1981 suits to accomplish much the same result in contract actions.
Justice Kennedy's opinion speaks of deference to the doctrine of stare
decisis, while it simultaneously eliminates most of the contract issues that
can be litigated under section 1981. Justice Kennedy wrote:
[Tihe right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either
logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation
has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or
imposition of discriminatory working conditions. Such postformation
conduct does not involve the right to make a contract 39
Although it is standard contract doctrine that enforcing contracts means
the right to performance or damages,38 9 for Kennedy, the enforcement
380. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
381. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
382. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
383. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
384. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
385. The exception is McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990).
386. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
387. 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976). Section 1981 states that "all persons shall have the right
to make and enforce contracts " 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
388. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373 (emphasis added).
389. See Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson and a State Law
Alternative, 25 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REv 433, 450-58 (1990).
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language of section 1981 applied only to "conduct by an employer which
impairs an employee's ability to enforce through [the] legal process his or
her established contract rights." 319 The metaphysical moment of contract
"formation," the moment that has given so many law students, law pro-
fessors and courts headaches, becomes the only point at which discrimination
is relevant. Harassment violating the terms and conditions of employment,
freedom from which is arguably a term of the contract, was neither an
issue of contract formation nor an impediment to using the legal process
to enforce contract rights. "[R]acial harassment amounting to breach of
contract, like racial harassment alone, impairs neither the right to make
nor the right to enforce a contract." '39 Allowing suits under section 1981
for breach of contract would "federalize all state-law claims for breach of
contract where racial animus is alleged," which presumably raises a threat
of chaos and loss of states' rights. Finally, to litigate discrimination at the
formation stage under section 1981, individuals must prove discrimination
according to the Title VII framework for burdens and standard of proof,
thus, an effective legal remedy for individuals suffering from "private"
racial discrimination has been sharply limited. Employers and other "pri-
vate" actors not covered by Title VII (as well as those who are) who do
not discriminate at the metaphysical formation stage are immune from suits
alleging racist discrimination in the contractual relationship.
Another example of a formally authoritarian approach with substantively
authoritarian overtones appears in the cases denying federal habeas relief
to persons sentenced to death. In Teague, a plurality of the Court held that
state defendants could not use federal habeas proceedings to attack their
convictions if their claims were based on a "new rule" of constitutional
criminal procedure.3 92 A majority of the Court in 1990, in Butler v. Mc-
Kellar,3 93 interpreted the "new rule/new law" language of Teague to mean
that "a decision announces a new rule 'if the result was not dictated by
precedent "')394 Defendants may not rely on reasonable doctrinal de-
velopment to avoid being barred from seeking habeas relief. Rather, the
Court defined "rule" to mean specific, umnterpreted commands. A court's
deterrmnation that its decision was within the logic of a prior decision or
even .'controlled.' by a prior decision does not exempt such decisions
from being "new rules." 395 Differences among courts which are eventually
resolved by the Supreme Court also produce new rules. Further, the majority
390. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
391. Id. at 2376.
392. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1068.
393. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
394. Id. at 1216 (emphasis in onginal) (citation ormtted) (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at
1070).
395. Id. at 1217
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opimon quoted approvingly from Teague's suggestion that habeas corpus
serves only the punitive function of deterring state courts from committing
constitutional violations; a new rule could not possibly deter the state courts,
and therefore defendants cannot rely on such rules. 39 An alternative inter-
pretation of federal habeas corpus, that all individuals in the United States
should enjoy the same constitutional rights and protections regardless of
what state they live in, was ignored.
In what can be characterized as vindictive language, 397 the Butler Court
held that a death row inmate could not invoke either of Teague's exceptions
to the new rule barrier. Police interrogation of an already-represented
murder defendant, a violation of the fifth amendment according to prece-
dent,3 98 was neither the kind of conduct beyond the lawmaking authority
to proscribe nor a procedure "'implicit in the concept of ordered liber-
ty."' 3" The pure command notion, together with the punitive tone of the
opimon, is startlingly authoritarian; as Joseph Hoffmann observed in the
context of the earlier Teague decision, the result is that the state courts will
be the primary interpreters of federal constitutional rights in criminal
cases.4°
Those who would argue for formal authoritarianism in the guise of
obedience to absolute rules, because such formality produces better results
than allowing judges to impose their own values and curbs wicked deci-
sionmakers, could point to the flag-burmng case, Texas v Johnson,401 as a
victory for rule-boundedness. Unlike the sometimes-on, sometimes-off right
to an abortion, which was created by an activist Court, the first amendment
is a textual command that must be obeyed. Perhaps authoritarian obedience
to command is the reason that a bare majority could hold that the Texas
flag desecration statute was unconstitutional in Johnson. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Scalia and Kennedy filed an opinion that was consistent with
existing first amendment precedent and that "obeyed" the command against
restricting freedom of speech.
Apparently defending against the dissent's implied criticism that he was
unpatriotic, however, Justice Kennedy wrote an agonized concurrence that
more clearly illustrates an authoritarian obedience that curbed a substantively
authoritarian, repressive urge. Only Kennedy's duty to obey "a pure com-
mand of the Constitution" could cause Kennedy to rule agamst the "lonely
place of honor" the flag holds "in an age when absolutes are distrusted
396. Id.
397. I am indebted to Robert Weisberg for this characterization.
398. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1216.
399. Id. at 1218 (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1064).
400. Hoffmann, supra note 376; see also Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J.
CRIm. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 9 (1990).
401. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
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and simple truths are burdened by unneeded apologetics." 401 His concurrence
hastens to sympathize with the dissenters, and he extols the flag as a symbol
"constant in expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs in law and peace
and that freedom which sustains the human spirit." 4 3 Perhaps, then, the
case means only that authoritarian obedience to commands will have good
results if the command is a good one.4°4 Further, although Kennedy saw a
clear command to obey the Constitution's demand for a liberal result, four
justices saw the command differently, thus undermining the assertion that
obedience to "clear" commands constrains judges.
The Chief Justice's dissent stressed the meaning of the flag in militaristic
and nationalistic terms, chronicling its use in wars and its value to the
military Rehnquist dismissively referred to the powerful communication of
burning a flag as an "inarticulate grunt."' 4 5 Because it was only an inartic-
ulate grunt, flag burning was tantamount to antagonizing others and was
unprotected under the fighting words exception for freedom of speech.4
This analogy in itself is unremarkable, because there was reason to think
that burning the flag would cause emotional distress to many. But the
dissent didn't stop there. Rehnquist accused the majority of "anti-demo-
cratic" meddling and disparaged them for having engaged in a "regrettably
patronizing civics lecture" instead of having upheld an important counter-
majoritarian textual right.40 Invoking democracy and majoritanamsm,
Rehnquist asserted: "Surely one of the high purposes of a democratic
society is to legislate against conduct that is regarded as evil and profoundly
offensive to the majority of people-whether it be murder, embezzlement,
pollution, or flag burning."' 40 Declaring that flag burning is tantamount to
the human harms brought about by murder, theft or toxic chemicals seems
unjustifiable; it does not entail a physical intrusion or tangible loss. Although
some may experience psychological pain, the psychological pain caused by
flag burning certainly cannot be greater than the pain caused by racist hate
speech and pornography, which currently enjoy first amendment protection.
Further, if the state has no duty to prevent severe physical harms according
to the Court's opinion in DeShaney,409 it is odd that it has a duty to protect
402. Id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
403. Id.
404. See infra note 487; see also TuHE AuTHoRrrUARN PERSONALITY, supra note 78, at 373.
405. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
406. Id. at 2553-54. The decision in Johnson met with angry calls from the President and
Congress for a constitutional amendment prohibiting the burning of flags and to the passage
of a federal statute prohibiting flag burning. See also Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On
Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. Rav 1337 (1990). This, together with an accompanying
outburst of patriotic fervor, indicates a growing recourse to authoritarianism in the United
States.
407. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
408. Id.
409. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
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people from seeing an important symbol destroyed. Having declared in
Webster4 10 that the Court decides what the Constitution requires, Rehnquist
wrote in Johnson: "Our Constitution wisely places limits on powers of
legislative majorities to act, but the declaration of such limits by this Court
'is, at all times, a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever,
to be decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful case." '' 41 The inconsistency
in these cases indicates that Rehnquist may be untroubled by manipulating
pnnciples to serve ends.
An examination of the Court's reasoning and language in specific cases
reinforces the argument that the Court recently has taken a more direct
substantively authoritarian approach to constitutional cases. Racism, na-
tionalism and indifference to oppression characterize these opinions. Affir-
mative action, originally meant to assure substantive equality for members
of groups that have been victims of stereotypy and subordination, has been
controversial in a society dedicated to individualism and an "equal oppor-
tunity mythology, ' 412 but it was also anathema to authoritarian prejudice.
Absent stereotypy, misogyny and racism, it is difficult to believe that the
phrase could have been transformed from a positive meaning to a code
word for "less qualified," "reverse racism," "quotas," and worse. A
majority of the Supreme Court now appears to have adopted the negative
view, however. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,4 3 a majority of
the Justices struck down a mandatory local government set-aside program
for minority-owned construction businesses as a violation of the equal
protection clause. Such plans deny equal protection to whites and discrim-
inate against whites. The opinions make clear that state and local govern-
ments are now violating equal protection if they have minority set-aside
plans aimed at remedying past discrimination, absent a fairly demanding
standard of proof of causation: they must admit that they themselves
intentionally discnminated or aided in discnrmnation. State and congres-
sional power to pass remedial legislation under section five of the fourteenth
amendment also seems dubious. 41 4
410. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3040.
411. Johnson, i09 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810)).
412. Crenshaw, supra note 347, at 1380.
413. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
414. Immediately after Croson, the Georgia Supreme Court and a federal district court in
Wisconsin struck down a city and a state set-aside program, respectively. See American
Subcontractor's Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 376 S.E.2d 662 (1989); Milwaukee
County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 707 F Supp. 1016 (1989); see also The Supreme Court-
Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. Rnv. 137, 228 (1989); Fried, Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.. A Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YA.E L.J. 155
(1989); Taylor, The Equal Protection Dilemma of Voluntary State and Local Set-Aside
Programs for Minorities and Women, 27 Hous. L. Rav. 45 (1990).
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In the Croson case, Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality, used a
formally authoritarian mode in stating that granting victims of societal
discrimination preference "would be contrary to both the letter and spirit
of a constitutional provision whose central command is equality;''41S her
equality is a formal, neutral equality rather than a richer, more substantive
equality Absent a showing of intentional discrimination, no race-conscious
affirmative action is constitutional. O'Connor found no difference in cul-
tural meaning between African-American and white, stating that all
"[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. ' 416 Try
as one might, it is difficult to see that whites are disadvantaged or stig-
matized by their race in the United States, or even in Richmond, Virginia,
nor does Justice O'Connor's opinion cite any evidence to support this
particular interpretation. With almost willful blindness, O'Connor wrote
that "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry there is simply no way of
determining what [racial] classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferi-
ority or simple racial politics; ' 417 accordingly, all racial classifications, for
whatever purpose, are suspect. Further, her opinion emphasizes the African-
American "dominance" of the Richmond city council and implies that
whites might be a disadvantaged minority in Richmond. The racist overtones
of the opinion are hard to overlook, as is the substantively authoritarian
agenda of a majority of the Justices.
Rhetorically, Justice O'Connor's opinion also contains a substantively
authoritarian tone of hostility- pejorative language and sarcasm appear in
her disnussal of the city's efforts to remedy the effects of past discrimination
in the construction industry The affirmative action medical school admis-
sions plan in Regents of the University of California v Bakke"" was a
"racially segregated" one, even though what it sought was integration. 41 9
The city's assertion of discrimination against minorities was "sheer specu-
lation." The Richmond program defined "Minority Business Enterprise"
to include Latino, Asian, Native American, Eskimo and Aleut businesses;
O'Connor wrote somewhat sarcastically-
The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may
never have suffered from discnmination in Richmond, suggests that
perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.
If a 30% set aside was "narrowly tailored" to compensate black
contractors for past discrimination, one may legitimately ask why they
415. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 727 (emphasis added).
416. Id. at 721; see Crenshaw, supra note 347, at 1373-86; Lawrence, supra note 34 (on the
meamng of being African-Amencan in the United States).
417 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721.
418. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
419. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 722.
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are forced to share this "remedial relief" with an Aleut citizen who
moves to'Richmond tomorrow?' 2
Much as Justice Powell had done in rejecting the claim of discrimination
in McCleskey, O'Connor employed the argument of social chaos as a trope
against affirmative action to ameliorate societal discrimination, unsympath-
etically dismissing the possible claims of those so oppressed. O'Connor
wrote that "[to accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination
alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open
the door to competing claims for 'remedial relief' for every disadvantaged
group. ' 42' As Patricia Williams commented, this argument "sets up a
'slippery slope' at the bottom of which lie hordes-in-waiting of warring
barbarians . . It problematizes by conjuring mythic dangers. ' ' 42 As
Williams noted in her criticism of the Richmond decision:
What strikes me most about this holding are the rhetorical devices
the court employs to justify its outcome: . societal discrimination is
"too amorphous"; racial goals are labelled "unyielding"; goals are
labelled "quotas"; testimony becomes mere "recitation"; legislative
purpose and action become "simple legislative assurances of good in-
tention"; lower court opimon is disregarded as just "blind judicial
deference"; and statistics are rendered "generalizations."-
In 1990, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion with strong nationalistic
and militaristic overtones. In United States v. Verdugo-Urqudez,424 Rehn-
quist invoked the plain meamng of the text of the Constitution, the intent
of the framers, and militaristic justifications to hold that the fourth amend-
ment did not bind the United States government in searching and seizing
the property of foreign nationals in their own countries. Even those foreign
nationals arrested and brought to the United States and imprisoned by this
country have no grounds to invoke our Constitution or its procedural
protections. The words "the people" in the fourth amendment referred only
to "the People of the United States." 42 According to Rehnquist, the intent
of the framers "never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain
the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United
States territory. ' 42 Brushing aside the cases which hold that the equal
protection clause applies to aliens, Rehnquist wrote that such protections
only applied to aliens with "substantial connections" to the United States,
420. Id. at 728.
421. Id. at 727.
422. Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87
MICH. L. Ray. 2128, 2129 (1989).
423. Id. at 2129 (footnotes omitted).
424. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
425. Id. at 1060-61.
426. Id. at 1061.
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not to foreign nationals in their own countries. 427 Relying on cases decided
before the Court's development of constitutional procedural protections and
even before the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, Rehnquist asserted that
"not every consfitutional provision applies to governmental activity even
where the United States has sovereign power. ' 428 Honoring the Rule of Law
for foreign nationals would cripple national security, national interests, and
the option of resorting to armed force. Once again, the notion of hordes
waiting to litigate claims became a justification for dismissing the petitioner's
claim that the government had to follow its own Constitution. 429 As Justices
Brennan and Marshall pointed out in dissent, "we cannot forget that the
behavior of our law enforcement agents abroad sends a powerful message
about the Rule of Law to individuals everywhere. . If we seek respect
for law and order, we must observe these principles ourselves." 430 A mili-
taristic, authoritarian government will ignore the rules and use its power as
it sees fit;43' the majority opimon approves of the use of such power.
Members of the Court have engaged in various strategies to arrive at
arguably substantively authoritarian results, as in the death penalty cases,
while abandomng the same strategies when they fail to support the Justice's
predilections or prejudices. Two opinions by Justice Scalia provide an
example of this willingness to use strategies selectively In his opimon
upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty for minors aged sixteen
or older in Stanford v Kentucky, 432 Justice Scalia asserted that state legis-
latures provided the best evidence of contemporary values regarding exe-
cution of juvenile offenders. 433 Because a "majority of the States that permit
capital punishment authorize it for crimes committed at age 16 or above, ' 434
the execution of minors who committed their offenses at the age of sixteen
or seventeen was constitutionally permissible. But in Michael H. v Gerald
D., 435 a due process challenge by a biological father to a California statute
allowing only the husband or wife to challenge the presumption of biological
parentage of children born during a marriage, Justice Scalia wrote:
[I]t is ultimately irrelevant, even for purposes of determining current
social attitudes towards the alleged substantive right Michael asserts,
that the present law in a number of States appears to allow the natural
father the theoretical power to rebut the marital presumption
427. Id. at 1064.
428. Id. at 1062.
429. Id. at 1065.
430. Id. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
431. A. PERLMUTTER, supra note 18, at 51.
432. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
433. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975 (1989).
434. Id. at 2976.
435. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
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What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive parental
rights to the natural father of a child 436
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 4 7 although the Court did
not abolish the right to abortion, the majority opinions indicated little
sympathy or concern for women. The majority opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist relied on the Court's decision in the DeShaney case for the
proposition that there is no "'affirmative right to governmental aid ' ' 438 in
reaching a holding that a state prohibition on the use of public hospitals
by public employees for performing abortions simply "leaves a pregnant
woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any
public hospitals at all." 439 Rejecting the trimester divisions of Roe,4 Rehn-
qmst, writing for four justices, stated that there was no reason "why the
State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence
only at the point of viability."' 441 Rehnquist heavily implied that the state's
interest in "protecting potential human life [exists] throughout preg-
nancy." 442 His opinion makes the textualist argument that nothing in the
Constitution's text could supply a principled basis for the trimester divi-
sion. 443 But while ostensibly obeying the command of the text, Rehnquist
declared that there was no reason to obey precedent;" 4 the Court itself is
the only entity that can determine the meaning of the Constitution, it alone
determines the command of the Constitution. The doctrine of stare decisis
"has less power in constitutional cases, where, save for constitutional
amendments, this Court is the only body able to make needed changes." 44
And, although only the Court could decide constitutional issues, Rehnquist
appealed to democracy and the legislative process as justifications for
deferring to the command of the Missoun legislature in Webster 446 He
noted that "[tihe goal of constitutional adjudication is to hold true the
balance between that which the Constitution puts beyond the reach of the
democratic process and that which it does not. We think we have done that
today."447
436. Id. at 2344 (emphasis in original). In the beginning of the opinion, Justice Scalia wrote
somewhat sarcastically that "[a]t the outset, it is necessary to clarify what [Michael H.] sought
and what he was denied. California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood," denigrating the humanity of the biological father and simultaneously indicating
a bias against violation of conventional norms. Id. at 2339.
437. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
438. Id. at 3051 (quoting DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003).
439. Id. at 3052.
440. Id. at 3056.
441. Id. at 3057.
442.. Id.
443. Id. at 3056-57.
444. Id. at 3056.
445. Id. at 3056 (emphasis added).
446. E.g., id. at 3053, 3055, 3058.
447. Id. at 3058.
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Striking the balance between what the Constitution places beyond the
political process and what it leaves to the political process is defensible in
the case of abortion, because there is no explicit textual reference to privacy
or to equal protection for women. But the Court has not stopped there. In
a 1990 opimon by Justice Scalia, the Court suggested that the government
could control even rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v Smith,44 the Court held that
the free exercise clause of the first amendment did not protect sacramental
use of peyote by members of the Native American Church from state
regulation. In an opinion that quoted Frankfurter's opinion in Minersville
School District v Gobitis"9-a case that had been overruled by the Court-
and that distinguished every free exercise decision upholding the right to
practice religion against state interference, Justice Scalia also suggested that
nothing in the Constitution protects basic rights and freedoms from gov-
ernment control.450 As long as the state does not "intentionally" discriminate
against a religious group, it can forbid members of the faith to practice
their sacraments and beliefs by majority vote for any arguably rational
reason. 451 Scalia wrote: "Values that are protected against government
interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby
banished from the political process. ' 452
Scalia refers to the threat of social chaos or anarchy in vaguely disguised
form several times in his opinion; fear of social chaos and emphasis on
order and control are hallmarks of substantive authoritarianism. At one
point, he quoted Reynolds v United States,453 the Mormon polygamy case,
to argue that citizens must not be a law unto themselves454 and again raised
the spectre of anarchistic law-unto-themselves later in the opinion in order
to justify denying any special privilege for the free exercise of religion.455
Perhaps even more chilling is Scalia's dismissal of the value in free exercise,
which Justice O'Connor's concurrence noted was "our Nation's fundamental
commitment to individual religious liberty,' '456 especially for those who are
discrimnated against or are victims of prejudice. According to Scalia and
four other Justices:
[To say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is per-
mitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
448. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
449. 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (flag salute case overruled by West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
450. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602-06.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1606.
453. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
454. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
455. Id. at 1603, 1606.
456. Id. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be
discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation
to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs.417
Native Americans, historically the targets of discrimination, not to mention
near genocide, are likely to suffer further discrimination because of their
religious beliefs, or at a rmmmum, "a relative disadvantage" in the "political
process."
The retirement of Justice Brennan, whose presence on the Court accounted
for the majorities m the flag-burning and F.C.C. minority-preference cases, 451
leaves no reason to believe that the Court will change its authoritarian
direction in the near future, and much reason to worry about the authori-
tarian jurisprudence that has justified this direction. Given the general
cultural assumption that citizens are to obey the Court's pronouncements,
and the reality that the Court's judgments influence legal understanding,
the current direction is troubling for liberal/progressive and anti-authori-
tarian hopes. Although, at this point, the efforts of liberal/progressive
scholars might be better directed toward the legislative and executive branches,
courts will still be playing a role in shaping law and the language of legal
rhetoric. Ceding the control of legal discourse in the courts to the current
majority of the Supreme Court would be a mistake; at a minimum, an
alternative discourse must always be available. Further, while the immediate
future appears bleak, change can and does occur, and a developed anti-
authoritarian approach should be available when there is a change. In order
to avoid giving up on the courts, liberal/progressives must understand what
the anti-authoritarian stance is and use it to the best of their ability in
framing constitutional theory and practice, both before courts and in
legislatures.
III. AGAINST LEGAL AUTHORITARIANISM
To combat authoritarianism in law, we need to develop a different
understanding of law and authority. It may be useful to this end to
understand which attitudes and beliefs appear to have anti-authoritaran
457. Id. (emphasis added).
458. Brennan wrote the majority opinions in Eichman and Johnson, the two flag desecration
cases, and in Metro Broadcasting, the case upholding minority preferences for new broadcasting
licenses. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
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tendencies. This section briefly discusses approaches that seem to be useful
in restraimng the impulse toward authoritanamsm. Drawing on studies by
social scientists, the section then suggests that particular legal theories would
support a non-authoritarian vision of the Rule of Law. Studies by social
scientists and psychological theorists suggest that certain orientations to
authority enable people to resist and combat authoritarianism. Although
the anti-authoritarian attitude can rest on several different grounds, and
holding the attitude does not always lead to goodness or altruism just as
holding an authoritarian attitude does not preclude some goodness or
altruistic acts, the attitude does resist oppression and domination of others.
Such an attitude toward law, emerging in some feminist, critical race and
humanist jurisprudence, and never absent entirely from a jurisprudence
resting on a strong belief in human rights, may hold the most promise for
combatting authoritarianism in legal thinking.
In The Authoritarian Personality study, 4 9 the authors indicated that non-
authoritarians were low on ethnocentricity and high on tolerance of differ-
ence. 4 0 Although acknowledging that it was more difficult to generalize
from the data about the anti-authoritarian personality, the authors divided
individuals with low scores on authoritarianism into various "syndromes"
that they then evaluated in psychoanalytic terms. Two of the "syndromes"-
the "Easy-Going Low Scorer" and the "Genuine Liberal"-are of particular
interest."'1 Together with the "protesting," or reactive, low scorer, the
"easy-going" low scorer accounted for the most frequent type of low
scorer." 2 The authors described the easy-going person as non-violent, com-
passionate, imaginative and non-judgmental.4 3 Far from being patriarchal
or sexist, easy-going people "may best be characterized as those who know
no fear of women."" The authors criticize the easy-going person as too
passive to be likely to resist oppression, although "one may count on them
as on persons who, under no circumstances, ever will adjust themselves to
political or psychological fascism."465 The "genuine liberal," like the easy-
going person, is "compassionate," but the authors concluded that she is
more likely to take action against oppression. 46 From the somewhat sketchy
description of the genuine liberal given by the authors (and from references
in a later study to the Kantian morality4O preferred by the authors of The
459. Tnz AuHoRiTARIuN PERSONALITY, supra note 78.
460. Id. at 191-208.
461. Id. at 380-85.
462. Id. at 373. The authors emphasized that "low scorers are as a whole less 'typed' than
high scorers," however. Id.
463. Id. at 380-81.
464. Id. at 381.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 383.
467. S. OLINER & P OLINER, supra note 38, at 255-57.
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Authoritarian Personality), it appears that the "genuine liberal" personality
is a rights-focused one. The authors seem to have found anti-authoritarian
tendencies in people who resembled either Kohlberg's rights-based higher
stages of moral development"8 or Gilligan's higher stages of an ethic of
care and morality of non-violence. 469
In The Altruistic Personality,470 a study of individuals who helped Jewish
people during the Nazi reign of terror in Europe, two researchers found
that rescuers differed from nonrescuers in several important respects. First,
they reported different upbringing: The parents of rescuers tended to em-.
phasize the values of care-"the need to be helpful, hospitable, concerned,
and loving" 471-and were "significantly less likely to emphasize obedience" 472
or to use physical force in disciplining their children. 473 The parents of
rescuers taught them that "Ic]are was not a spectator sport, it compelled
action. It meant assuming personal responsibility.. ."474 Thus, the rescuers
were more likely to have been raised in non-authoritarian homes and less
likely to have developed either a fear of or an absolute identity with
authority. Second, although rescuers and nonrescuers did not significantly
differ overall in their ability to empathize with others, at least in terms of
emotional contagion (taking on the mood or emotion of another), rescuers
were more responsive to others' pain, sadness and helplessness. 475 Third,
the rescuers resembled the anti-authoritarian "genuine liberal ' 476 in several
ways. They tended to have had parents who rarely used physical punishment
to discipline their children and who were approving of their children, a
factor that seems to correlate with low ethnocentrism and high democratic
potential. 4"7 The rescuers, "like Adorno's antifascists, were more character-
ized by close relationships with others, empathy for and identification with
the underdog, and perceptions of others as individuals rather than as
representatives of a [stereo]type ... ."471 Finally, the authors of The Al-
truistic Personality found a difference as well; The Authoritarian Personality
depended too much upon identifying the "true" anti-authoritarian as an
independent, ego-integrated individual who embodied a Kantian vision of
the moral development at the expense of other forms of moral development,
468. See Blum, supra note 34.
469. C. GmuoAN, supra note 324; see also Gilligan & Attanucci, Two Moral Orientations,
in MAPPING THE MoRAL DoimN 73 (1988).
470. S. Ouamit & P Oqanm, supra note 38.
471. Id. at 164.
472. Id. at 162.
473. Id. at 179-80, 249.
474. Id. at 168.
475. Id. at 174.
476. See Tam AumRoarARiAN PERSONALiT, supra note 78 (contaimng a description of the
"genuine liberal").
477. S. OLINR & P OutnER, supra note 38, at 256.
478. Id.
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such as Carol Gilligan's ethic of care. 479 Rescuers fell in both categories,
but many followed the ethic of care. Thus, the fear of Adorno and Ins co-
authors-that those whom they termed the "easy-goer" would not take
action against fascism-seems to have been misplaced.
The characteristics of rescuers, by and large, were inconsistent both with
the economic model of rational self-interested behavior and with the argu-
ment that human beings "need" authority in order to curb their violent
tendencies. The authors identified four rough categories of rescuers, de-
pending on their reported reason for helping Jews, although care for others
was a common thread among the groups. In one group, this care appeared
to stem from exposure to parental values "emphasiz[ing] caring for others,
dependability, and independence. ' 40 Caring more concretely influenced
another group of rescuers, who acted because of their friendship and contact
with Jewish people. 41 A third group felt personal responsibility for society
as a whole and felt connected to, and responsible for, everyone in their
society. 482 A fourth group was "egalitarian," feeling a general similarity
with all people; "[w]hat moved them most was others' pain, and they felt
a strong responsibility to relieve it. ' '483 But, "rescuers [were] not saints. ' '4 4
They had difficulties with and resentments of some of the individuals they
rescued; nonetheless, they persisted. Overall, "[w]hat distinguished rescuers
was not their lack of concern with self, external approval, or achievement,
but rather their capacity for extensive relationships-their stronger sense of
attachment to others and their feeling of responsibility for the welfare of
others, including those outside their immediate familial or communal cir-
cles. ' 485
Although "[iinvolvement, commitment, care, and responsibility" char-
acterized those willing to defy authority and sheer force in order to take
affirmative actions to help Jews, the "catalysts" for altruistic action varied.
The authors found that individuals gave three general reasons for helping:
many individuals acted from an empathic response to their direct or indirect
knowledge of the pain inflicted upon Jewish people; 4 6 others responded to,
or obeyed, the normative demand of "a highly valued social group" such
as these relatively few churches that opposed the Nazi efforts to exterminate
the Jews;4 7 and others saw outside events as violating their principles of
479. Id. at 257-58.
480. Id. at 184.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 185.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 239.
485. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
486. Id. at 185.
487. Id. at 199-203.
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justice or of care and acted out of princple.1 Only in the instance of the
"normocentric" rescuers, those who obeyed the commands of authorities
to help Jewish people, does an authoritarian orientation perhaps occur,
lending support to the argument made in this Article that it is the goodness
of the authority, rather than obedience per se, that determines good out-
comes. Abstract principles, empathy, or following the normative rules of
an authoritative group did not, of course, guarantee virtue, but empathy
and principles of care or fairness were common and inspired acts of moral
courage in the group studied.
In another study, two researchers used surveys of Americans to explore
why people do horrible things to others at the behest of authority, and why
others might approve those actions. This sociological study was particularly
concerned with obedience to "legitimate" political authority that led to
"crimes of obedience," or the comrmssion of hurtful or atrocious acts in
the name of superior orders or authorities. 419 "Crimes of obedience,"
defined as the comnussion of acts that are illegal or that the person should
have known were illegal while obeying "superior orders, ' 1490 entail individual
moral responsibility as well as authoritarian punitiveness and rigidity. To
determine whether orientation to authority affected perceptions of individual
moral responsibility, the researchers conducted surveys on attitudes about
the conviction of Lieutenant Calley in the My Lai massacre case together
with measures of attitudes about authority, obedience, and attitudes about
particular hypothetical and real cases. While the authors recognized that
the responses from individuals about what they would do in similar circum-
stances does not prove what they actually would do if they were in the
situation of being ordered to obey immoral or illegal commands, 491 their
study confirmed the relation of authoritarian submissiveness and identifi-
cation with authority to a willingness to approve authoritarian oppression.
The authors were unable to develop a statistically significant measure for
the anti-authoritarian orientation, which they termed "value orientation,"
but the group they identified as value oriented did test low on measures of
authoritarianism, traditional moralism and conservatism. 492 Because both
488. Id. at 188, 209.
489. "Crimes of obedience are a consequence of authority run amok," as in the My Lai
massacre. H. KELmAN & V HAmLTON, supra note 74, at 20.
490. Id. at 46-51.
491. Id. at 262; see also S. MrILGAM, supra note 71.
492. H. KEImAN & V HAmILoTN, supra note 74, at 304. Part of the difficulty may have
come from the questions used to measure "value orientation." The authors observed that the
scale used to measure the value set contained many items that most people m American culture
would agree with no matter what their ultimate orientation to authority. Id. at 304-05. The
"value oriented" individual descriptively and empirically appears to be upper-middle-class in
education and status; rather than subscribe to the hypothesis of "working class authoritan-
arusm," the authors note that upper classes would experience more personal efficacy and
ability to resist authority. Id. at 316.
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the traditional moralism and the conservatism scales correlated with the
measure of authoritananism developed by Adorno and his co-authors, one
might tentafively conclude that the non-authoritarians in the crimes of
obedience study would meet the characteristics described as anti-authoritar-
ian by the Adorno study Descriptively, the non-authoritarian individuals
were likely to assert individual responsibility for crimes of obedience and
to measure authority's commands by their personal moral standards. 493 They
supported the government, but the support was conditioned on whether the
government upheld the values and principles for which they understood it
to stand.4 4 Overall, the study concluded that
[v]alue orientation was related to a tendency to assert individual re-
sponsibility for crimes of obedience and to a disposition to disobey
commands that violate the individual's own principles. In contrast, the
rule and role scales were both associated with a tendency to deny
individual responsibility and a disposition to obey authoritative orders."95
The anti-authoritanan orientation can be care-based or rights-based, but
in either instance, it grows out of a sense of personal moral responsibility,
sympathy towards, and recognition of, the individual dignity and humanity
of others. The orientation includes a sense of responsibility for others, an
ethic of care, a capacity for compassion and empathy-particularly for the
pain of others-together with a sense of independence from conventional
morality. Tolerance of difference and of ambiguity also characterizes the
anti-authoritarian attitude, but this by no means entails passive inaction.
Rather, such tolerance is a refusal to engage in stereotypy and categorization
of persons, a resistance to us/them thinking, and an ability to place
commonality rather than difference at the base of relationship to others.
Just as authoritarians are capable of good, anti-authoritarians are capable
of evil, but their tendency toward inclusion, relationship and care for others
mitigates the tendency to exclusion, punishment and oppression of those
who are different.
Individual moral responsibility, respect and care for others, empathy for
the pain of others, tolerance for diversity, concern for the rights of indi-
viduals-each of these elements seems robustly related to anti-authoritari-
anism. These elements are not foreign to legal thought. Thus it is important
to consider, briefly, what ways of thinking about law can help us in opposing
authoritarian oppression and subordination, and how we might think of
law as something other than a formal and substantive instrument of au-
thoritarianism. There are a number of scholarly legal arguments available
that embody these anti-authontarian traits. For example, Cover's work
493. Id. at 305.
494. Id. at 269.
495. Id. at 305.
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consistently emphasized the personal, individual moral responsibility of
judges in interpreting and applying the law. West's work frequently em-
phasizes personal moral responsibility and moral choice. 4" Moreover, the
arguments of humanist and progressive liberal scholars for positive and
negative rights generally fit a description of the anti-authoritarian. The
works of the "perfectionists" whom Monaghan criticized 497 are anti-au-
thoritarian in their arguments for the constitutional embodiment of those
"substantive goods" of individual dignity, freedom, universal justice, and
benevolence. 498
Karst's work, exemplified in his book Belonging to America,499 rejects
the notion of the Constitution as fixed command and argues for expansive
and inclusionary interpretation, particularly of the fourteenth amendment.
Observing that part of the character and history of the United States is
nativist, racist, sexist and intolerant-in short, authoritanan-Karst also
points to the elements of tolerance, understanding and inclusion in that
character and history. Against intolerance, subordination and exclusion of
the different, he argues for the use of our competing traditions of tolerance,
responsiveness and inclusion in interpreting and applying the Constitution.
For example, criticizing the Court's turn to. "discriminatory intent" as the
necessary element of equal protection violations as an effort "to contain"
the prormse of the clause, Karst argues for empathic and responsive con-
stitutional adjudication consistent with anti-authoritarian principles.
In reaction to the Court's authoritarian decision in Bowers v Hardwck,1
Michelman has argued for an understanding of strong personal rights,
grounded in respect for individuals, as necessary to full participation and
consideration in the formulation of non-authoritarian law.0" According to
Michelman, society can enforce its norms through law in a non-authoritarian
manner only when "law-rule" is the same as "self-rule." ' 502 And "self-rule"
is possible only in a process that is non-authoritarian itselfA0
Neither Karst nor Michelman, nor indeed most liberal humamst scholars,
is outside the range of "normal" discourse about law or legal understanding.
Their arguments are always already available to those seeking to combat
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authoritarian uses of law. The arguments of other legal scholars against the
relationship of law to authoritarian oppression, however, differ in their
emphasis on awareness of pain and suffering and their requirement of a
caring response. These other developing lines of scholarship are even more
markedly embodiments of anti-authoritanamsm, in that they emphasize
responsiveness and opposition to oppression and inclusion of diverse views
and visions in law. These lines of scholarship argue for the use of an anti-
subordination principle to combat the public and private oppression of
groups and individuals in society, for the hearing and taking account of
the voices of the oppressed in legal decisions and for the use of response
to human suffering and pain in legal decisionmaking. Ruth Colker, for
example, has argued that equal protection doctrine should center on an
anti-subordination principle that identifies and remedies the evils of "racial
patriarchy" 5°4 in the United States. The evils the anti-subordination principle
combats are the evils of authoritarianism: the dominance and oppression
of some by others and the denial of full human status to some human
beings by others. In deciding equal protection issues under the anti-subor-
dination principle, the effect of a practice on the subordinated is always
relevant. West has urged a reawakened personal sense of moral responsibility
for our actions as a way to make rights and freedoms meamngful against
oppressive, illiberal power. 05
The scholarship of many minority and feminist scholars urges consider-
ation of the voices of the oppressed in transforning law. By demonstrating
how the voices of the oppressed and the "different" have not been heard
in legal decisionmaking, and by demonstrating the oppressive effects of that
exclusion, they suggest how legal doctrine and rules mght be used to
liberate, rather than subordinate, human beings. By communicating the
experience of subordination, oppression and difference, these scholars also
appeal to our common humanity For example, Man Matsuda has argued
from the experience of Japanese Americans to show that reparations to
those interned by a racist government during World War II are not prob-
lematic under law, but consistent with it.°  Patricia Williams has argued
against inflexibility and absolutes in eloquently appealing to a celebrating
and nurturing of difference.51 7 Charles Lawrence and Matsuda have chal-
lenged the legal mind to address the harm of racist hate speech, using both
accounts of the effects of racist hate speech and legal doctnne. 0 Chns
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Littleton and Martha Mahoney have used stories and the law to depict the
situation of battered women and to suggest legal reform. 509 Robin West has
argued that Congress' power under section five of the fourteenth amendment
could be used to abolish the marital rape exemption in rape laws.510 Martha
Minow has argued that judges should be aware of their own assumptions
and biases so that they may be open to considering the message of those
who are different' Each of these and other scholars have messages that
challenge substantively authoritarian assumptions in the law of the United
States.
Scholars concerned that legal decisionmakers invoke a caring response
believe that the stones of those who are victims of authoritarian 'law can
increase understanding of their victimization or even bring about change in
law. These scholars agree that law is indeterminate in the sense that law is
always open to different interpretations, different resolutions and different
futures,512 and that legal doctrine can respond to caring for the pain of
others. As Karst and I have argued, 53 efforts to convey the pain caused by
particular laws or legal practices are important to morally good legal
decisionmaking. And morally good decisions require empathizing with those
historically and presently seen as Other and accordingly oppressed.51 4 Em-
pathy for the pain of others can be an essential element of resistance to
the persecution of others in an authoritarian system, as The Altruistic
Personality study suggests. As West has argued, knowing the pain of others
is possible and important for responsive, caring and, accordingly, anti-
authoritarian law: "The knowledge we learn this way-knowledge of the
subjectivity of others, gained and pursued through metaphor, allegory,
narrative, literature, and culture-is a peculiar sort of knowledge, but it is
absolutely essential to any meaningful quest for justice, legal or other-
wise. '515 Such empathy and understanding alert the moral sensors of the
responsible decisionmaker, who in turn may take action to end authoritarian
oppression.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that there is much in law and legal thinking that
is conducive to authoritarianism, and that particular arguments about law
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reinforce authoritarian applications of law. Authoritarian understandings of
law and legal decisionmaking rely on the paradigms of rule-following,
obedience to authority narrowly understood and suspicion of human nature.
While the present United States Supreme Court (and perhaps many federal
courts) appears to be taking both a formally and substantively authoritarian
approach to constitutional decisiomnaking, it should not be permtted to
define the umverse of legal discourse and constitutional understanding for
other courts or legislatures. 5 6 Nor should scholars and lawyers give up on
articulating humanitarian visions of law and the Constitution. The anti-
authoritarian, humanitarian vision of law and the Constitution is available,
and the vision of broader, more responsive, and liberating uses of law
should be the concern of all legal thinkers. Substantive authoritarianism
flourishes when we cease to take personal responsibility for the suffering
and oppression of others in the name of obedience to authority, including
legal authority. It is incumbent upon us to take responsibility-
Notlung in law is so fixed that we don't have responsibility for acting
creatively in making things just. When we go to sleep at night, we must
reflect that we have done something political that very day: that in a
society of powerful and powerless, our decisions and non-decisions have
sided with one or the other."'
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